The committee will please come to order. A quorum is present. Uh the committee meets today pursuant to notice. Without objection, the chair may recess the committee at any point. uh dominating global research rankings,
American universities remain among the top academic institutions in the world. And that's how it ought to be. They're entrusted with hundreds of billions in taxpayer funding, research dollars, and federal student aid to help develop the
next generation of leaders and drive cutting edge scientific discovery. I just left a meeting starting in my office on myoma research that has some very promising things taking place and that's what we're looking for through the research that goes on at our
institutions. The free exchange of ideas is a core American principle and a cornerstone of higher education. International collaboration, whether through welcoming international students or creating international research partnerships, can
when done right, have a very positive effect for our country. However, it would be naive and reckless to ignore the dangerous uh the serious dangers facing our higher education system. Foreign adversaries, particularly
geopolitical rivals like the Chinese Communist Party CCP, are actively competing against our nation's interests on the battlegrounds of our university campuses. They're unafraid to exploit American good intentions for illgotten gains. I'm
proud that this committee has been a leader in combating malign foreign influence on college campuses. Last year, the House passed the Deterrent Act, which uh was a strong bipartisan vote for a second Congress in a in a
row. Deterrent would bring much needed transparency to foreign gifts and contracts under section 117 of the Higher Education Act, and I will continue working to get it signed into law. This committee's oversight has brought uh to light troubling
partnerships between American universities and the CCP's defense linked institutions, including joint research in institutes operating with American campuses. As a result of this work, many universities have taken steps
to shut down these programs. The Trump administration and Secretary McMahon have also taken this issue seriously. The education department has launched multiple section 117 compliance investigations, improve the usability of
disclosed data, and just last month announced an inter agency agreement with the Department of State to incorporate the State Department in national security expertise. Despite this progress, recent recent events make it clear that the threat
remains active. Last summer, there were multiple disturbing instances of potential foreign espionage on US campuses. At the University of Michigan, students, employees, uh, and faculty have been charged and
sentenced for conspiracy and smuggling related crimes. At Stanford, students were approached by foreign nationals posing as peers in an effort to get students to travel to China and share research.
These institutes or these instances must not be swept under the rug and I'm excited to discuss them more in depth today at this hearing. Institutions must be proactive in addressing these threats. They should not wait for a congressional inquiry or hearing before
taking a hard look at their campus culture, vetting processes, and compliances uh with the law. Openness is one of our great strengths, but it cannot become our greatest weakness. We can and we must ensure that
academic collaboration strengthens America, not our adversaries. With that, I yield to the ranking member, the gentle lady from Oregon, Miss Bonamichi. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for for being here
today. A college degree remains a sure path to the American dream, and it's the most reliable engine of economic mobility we have. With job numbers failing and the cost of living rising, it's vital that we protect and uplift paths to economic opportunity. College
graduates earn more. They experience lower unemployment rates, and they're better positioned to support their families and contribute to their communities and the economy. Right now, our country is in the midst of a college affordability crisis. Students and families are being forced to take out
crushing loans that may take them decades to repay. Today's hearing is ostensibly about espionage and foreign influence in higher education. Something we have discussed in this committee numerous times. Unfortunately, I fear that today's discussion will once again
focus on xenophobic xenophobic conspiracy theories and culture war debates instead of addressing real barriers that college students are facing. Allow me to be blunt. The greatest threat facing students today is not foreign influence or espionage in higher education. Although these
problems may exist, we can't easily quantify how or even whether they affect student life. And according to the testimony submitted today, which I have read, the processes are in place to address any foreign threat. They seem to be doing a decent job. I read your testimony. uh and uh there doesn't seem
to be anything close to a university under siege, which is what the title of this hearing uh portrays. What we can quantify, however, is the enormous and detrimental effect of the Trump administration's attacks on higher education, on student borrowers, on
their families, which is why committee Democrats have invited a representative from the Government Accountability Office today to provide us with real data and facts. Since the Trump administration returned to office, Secretary McMahon has been trying to carry out President Trump's stated goal of dismantling the Department of
Education to devastating effect. To date, the department has signed at least 10 inter agency agreements to transfer its programs away from the experts at the department to other agencies. These moves have proven to be inefficient, wasteful, and harmful to students and
families who are now being forced to deal with multiple agencies. These programs have been thrust upon agencies that do not have the knowledge or the expertise about complex topics like student financial aid and they do not understand the importance of successful programs like TRIO and GearUp that
increase the educational success of first generation college students. Recently, the GAO released a report showing that the department's office of federal student aid has actually stopped key oversight on loan servicesers. In its oversight of the $ 1.6 6 billion
student loan portfolio. The department is required, I think it's trillion, the department is required by law to ensure student loan servicesers provide borrowers with accurate information about their loans. And when they do not, borrowers can either overpay or be placed in the wrong student loan
repayment program. So, the department's refusal to conduct robust oversight of student loan services is a dereliction of duty. Importantly, when the department conducted oversight during the Biden administration, it issued penalties to four out of the five servicesers because they failed failed
to meet accuracy standards. And now, without that oversight, the government is likely paying servicesers for subpar or even illegal performance. And just last week, the department transferred its portfolio of defaulted student loans to the Treasury Department. Borrowers in default need support, but now they will
have limited access to the department's subject matter experts. This transfer means that student borrowers who may be eligible for discharge or other relief will need to discuss their situation with people who frankly don't have a clue about the how the program works. Uh the department has also announced that
it intends to hand over other student aid responsibilities to Treasury despite its lack of expertise. It certainly looks like the Trump administration's goal is to intentionally create cha chaos and confusion for these borrowers, many of whom are already in dire financial straits. Furthermore, the big
ugly law is about to make major changes to incomedriven repayment changes that will affect millions of Americans. But because of the reductions in force, the riffs, there are not enough staff left at the department to implement these cha changes and help borrowers navigate them. Starting on July 1st, millions of
Americans will be left in the dark with no resources to help them. And to make matters worse for students, the Trump administration's dismantling of the Office for Civil Rights has undermined our ability to address discrimination in and schools. In March of 2025, OCR staff
was cut in half. Seven of its 12 regional offices were forced to close. This move was not only devastating for students seeking resources for discrimination on campus, it was also inefficient and wasteful. A recent GAO report revealed that these layoffs may
have cost US taxpayers more than $38 million. If that doesn't qualify as waste, fraud, and abuse, I'm not sure what does. So, it is irresponsible and short-sighted for this committee to focus on vague threats of espionage which seem to be addressed by the universities. And instead of addressing
the real problems in front of us, it's time for Congress to step up and do its duty to protect students and families from the overreaches and abuses of the Trump administration. So, I urge my colleagues to listen to the unbiased reporting of GAO and consider whether blind loyalty this to this
administration is worth the costs outlined today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. I thank the gentle lady. Uh, pursuant to committee rule 8C, all members who wish to insert written statements into the record may do so by submitting them to
the committee clerk electronically in Microsoft Word format by 5:00 p.m. 14 days after this hearing. And without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 14 days to allow such statements and other extraneous material
noted during the hearing to be submitted for the official hearing records. I now turn to the introduction of our four witnesses. And in light of the sweet 16 success thus far, go blue. Uh it's a it's a
delight to welcome uh Dr. Dominico Graasso, the interim president of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, who certainly took over the interim position in a very interesting period of time. And thank you for the service you provided to the institution.
uh to introduce our second witness, I would like to recognize a representative from Florida, Mr. Fine. >> Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's always great to be able to introduce somebody from Florida where I would note that we have passed bills, as I'll talk about in my five minutes, to deal with
what is a real problem. Um, I want to just introduce Cassandra Farley. She's the senior director of research, integrity, security, and compliance at the University of Florida, uh, Florida's pre-minent institution in Gainesville, Florida. She's got an MBA from the University of South Florida and a BA in
economics from the University of Florida. She's also a certified compliance and ethics professional and an active contribut contributor to national organizations supporting research integrity, export controls, and research security. And I'm excited to hear her comments on how we are doing
things right in Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. >> Welcome. And I thank the gentleman. Our third witness is m Miss Melissa Emryas, the director of education, workforce, and income security team at the Government Accountability Office in
Washington, DC. Welcome. Our last witness is Elsa Johnson, the editor-inchief of the Stanford Review and Stanford, California. Welcome. We thank the witnesses for being here today. Pursuant to committee rules, I
would ask that you each limit your oral presentation to a threeminut summary of your written statement. The clock will count down from three minutes. As committee members have many questions for you and we would like to spend as much time as possible on questions.
However, pursuant to committee rule 8D and committee practice, we will not cut off your testimony until you reach the five minute mark. I would also like to remind the witnesses to be aware of their responsibility to provide accurate information to the committee. Having
said all of that, uh I will now recognize Dr. Graassu for your testimony. >> Thank you, Chairman Wahberg, Chairman Wahberg, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today
about research security at the University of Michigan. My name is Dominico Graasso and I have the privilege and honor of serving as a president of the University of Michigan since May 2025. My term will end this coming May. As an engineer and an Army
veteran who currently holds a top secret security clearance, I am deeply committed to protecting our nation's security and ensuring that the university continues to support the research, talent, and partnerships that help make Michigan special. The University of Michigan is one of the
nation's largest and most prominent research universities. It comprises three campuses and nearly 75,000 undergraduate and graduate students and 60,000 faculty and staff.
We have more than 110 programs ranked in the top 10 across the nation. With a $16 billion budget, the university engages in a broad range of activities driving our mission of academic excellence, innovation, and public service.
University is involved in a remarkable array of newsworthy activities. To give you a sense of the scale and national scope, not including sports news like the Sweet 16, which Chairman Wahlberg just mentioned, last year the University of Michigan was covered nearly 600 times
in just the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. There's a lot to follow. The university is a world leader in scientific and technological advancement. In 2025 alone, Michigan researchers developed more than 600 new
inventions, launched 30 new startups, and received more than 1,600 research awards. These milestones are made possible by Michigan's ability to attract the best and the brightest from every corner of the United States and the world. One example of the
university's advanced research capabilities and one close to my heart as an engineer and former army officer is our work towards keeping our country and the world safe from nuclear proliferation. The University of Michigan researchers
have developed the first ever imager that can detect both gamma rays and neutrons. An astonishing breakthrough in our nation's ability to detect material capable of producing nuclear weapons. Housing some of the world's greatest minds makes the University of Michigan a
potential target of threats such as research espionage, unauthorized technology transfer, and foreign talent recruitment programs. That is why the university has established a comprehensive program to safeguard our research from America's adversaries. We
share this committee's commitment to research integrity and have no tolerance for behavior that may risk the security of our nation. In isolated but serious incidents, a small number of university students and researchers from China have been arrested for unlawful activities.
In each case, individuals carried out their unlawful acts without the university's knowledge. Once alerted, we acted swiftly and decisively, working with federal law enforcement, promptly terminating student work visas and severing all ties with those
individuals. The university has a comprehensive research security and compliance program, which includes risk management for international collaborations, mandatory training, and data security protocols to ensure secure and safe research.
We are meeting the increased threat with increased security. We are setting universitywide standards for visiting researchers and expanding use of background checks. We are enhancing oversight of biological materials entering or leaving university labs and
strengthening physical security. And we are working to open more regular lines of communication with federal regulatory, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. Safety and security is a team effort and at Michigan we know how important it is to
be a team player. We stand committed to protecting the interests and security of the United States. This commitment is illustrated by our decision to end a relationship with a university in China that is seen as a potential threat to America's interests. We made this
decision after discussion with this committee and the House Select Committee on the CCP. We have a special bond with this committee as three of our close Michigan friends and neighbors, Chairman Wahlberg and Congresswoman Mlan and Stevens serve on it. We look forward to
continuing our dialogue with this committee to ensure that the interests of Michigan and of the nation are protected from both known threats we face today and those that may occur in the future. I emer I look forward to our
conversation. Thank you. >> I now recognize Miss Farley for your testimony. >> Chairman Wahberg, Ranking Member Scott, distinguished committee members, and fellow witnesses. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Cassandra Farley, senior director of
research integrity, security, and compliance at the University of Florida, where I serve as the institution's research security officer. I am testifying today on behalf of the University of Florida and UF's research security program. UF is a large public research university, home to 16 colleges
and more than 170 research centers and institutes. This past fiscal year, UF had over 1.33 billion in research expenditures. In the same period, UF received more than 817 million in awards from federal granting agencies with
significant funding coming from the Department of Health and Human Services, US Department of Agriculture, and the National Science Foundation. Our partnership with these agencies helps our researchers solve some of society's most pressing problems in healthcare, agriculture, space, and beyond. Today, I
want to highlight how UF protects that research enterprise from undue foreign influence. Beginning in 2018, our federal partners notified universities of increasing concerns about threats from foreign entities, particularly talent programs tied to the Chinese government, in which researchers sign
undisclosed agreements requiring them to publish federally funded fun findings under foreign affiliations, and recruit others into these programs. In response, federal agencies clarified their expectations and President Trump released National Security Memorandum 33, directing the development of
research security program requirements across federal agencies. Florida acted swiftly as well. In 2021, the Florida legislature unanimously passed and Governor Dantis signed into law the act relating to foreign influence, establishing a series of statutes that
are the foundation of UF's research security program today. These statutes require that Florida universities regularly report foreign gifts, contracts, and agreements, have a centralized international review and approval process, and screen all research and research support hires. The
statutes also prohibit gifts from entities in foreign countries of concern and bar agreements with such entities without prior approval from the for Florida Board of Governors. To build our research security program, UF made significant investments in personnel, technology, and new processes to further
improve our compliance posture. This research security program has several core components. Screening all new research hires and visiting scholars through a riskbased review process that evaluates background affiliations and the nature of the proposed research. Reviewing all international agreements
regardless of funding source. Maintaining a robust export control compliance operation. reviewing all international travel in advance and requiring compliance certifications from every traveler and mandating annual research security training for all federal award personnel as required by
the chips and science act. Additionally, as a matter of policy, UF will not enter into any contract, agreement, or activity with any entity on a US government restricted party list. Through strategic investments and its research security program and
partnership and collaboration at both the state and federal levels, the University of Florida continues to demonstrate that it can support and enable innovative and groundbreaking research while meaningfully working to secure the research enterprise. Thank you. >> Thank you.
Now recognize Miss Emory Eris for your testimony. >> Thank you, Chairman Wahberg, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Education's role in ensuring accountability in higher education. Education's
responsibilities include overseeing colleges, federal student aid, and the servicesers that help administer the student loan program. My remarks today addressed recent work examining education's oversight of student loan servicesers. I will also address key
prior GAO recommendations that education has yet to implement. Earlier this month, we reported on the impact of recent staffing reductions on education's oversight of its student loan servicesers. Specifically, we reported that in February of 25,
education stopped assessing student loan servicesers on accuracy and call quality due to lack of staff capacity. According to education officials, the two metrics were intended to measure whether student loan servicesers were one, keeping
complete and accurate records for borrowers and two providing borrowers good customer service. The decision to stop assessing these performance metrics occurred shortly after the administration began issuing presidential directives on downsizing
the federal workforce. Education reported that between January and December of 25, the number of staff at its office of federal student aid decreased 46%. Without this service or oversight,
education lacks reasonable assurance that borrower records are correct. Inaccurate records can result in borrowers being build for incorrect amounts or placed in the wrong repayment status. Additionally, borrowers need to be given correct information when they
call for help. To address these concerns, we recommended that education assess serer accuracy and call quality. Implementing our recommendations from prior years could also help education strengthen accountability.
For example, implementing our 2019 recommendations to improve verification of borrower income and family size could help reduce the risk of fraud and error in certain repayment plans and potentially save over two billion. Similarly, implementing our 2017
recommendation to update the formula for measuring the financial condition of colleges could help protect taxpayers against the financial risk of college closures. Finally, implementing our 2016 recommendation to improve tracking of
borrower complaints could help education better track trends and ensure the program effectively meets borrower needs. In conclusion, education should take action to strengthen accountability and better protect borrowers and
taxpayers. Thank you. >> Thank you. And now back to our topic for this morning. I recognize Miss Johnson for your testimony. >> Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Elsa Johnson. I'm a junior at Stanford University studying East Asian studies with a focus on China, and I serve as the editor-inchief of the Stamford Review, the independent paper on campus. I'm here because I was personally
targeted by a suspected agent of the Chinese Communist Party while conducting research at Stanford. I grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where I attended a Chinese language immersion school from kindergarten through 8th grade. I chose Stanford to deepen my understanding of a country whose language and culture have
shaped my upbringing. In the spring of my freshman year at Stanford, I began working as a research assistant at the Hoover Institution, focused on Chinese industry and military tactics. That summer, a man calling himself Charles Chen reached out to me on social media.
He had mutual followers with me and photos of Stanford on his profile. Over the following weeks, he asked detailed questions about my background, offered to pay for a trip to China, sent me a flight itinerary to Shanghai, and pressured me to move our conversation to
WeChat, an app that is monitored by the CCP. Then he publicly commented on one of my Instagram posts in Mandarin, asking me to delete screenshots I had taken of our conversation. I do not know how he knew I had these screenshots. The FBI confirmed he had no
affiliation with Stanford. He was likely operating on behalf of China's Ministry of State Security. I was one of at least 10 female students he targeted since 2020. After my co-author Garrett Malloy and I published our investigation, the
incidents worsened. I began receiving intimidation calls where callers would switch to Mandarin. And in one case, the caller referenced my mother. Just this week, I received another call from US number. After exchanging hellos, the caller switched to Mandarin and asked
whether I had finished dinner. I have also received threatening scam emails attempting to convince me to take down my reporting on this issue. This fall, the FBI informed me that I'm being physically monitored on Stanford's campus by agents of the CCP and that my
family is also being watched. I was fortunate to be at the Hoover Institution when I was targeted. The scholars there connected me with the FBI. If I had not been at Hoover, I don't know how I would have gotten help. There was no university resource to
call, no tip line to contact. I was a freshman navigating a foreign intelligence operation with no institutional support. After our investigations were published, Stanford issued a statement saying it was looking into the reports. That was almost a year ago and nothing meaningful
has changed. The university has not established a reporting mechanism for transnational oppression. It has not provided resources for students targeted by foreign governments. Stanford has the resources to build these systems. The question is whether the university has
the will. I'm testifying today because if this can happen to me, it is certainly happening to other students across the country who do not have a platform or path to law enforcement. American universities are supposed to be places where people can think and speak freely. Right now, for many students,
they are not. Thank you. >> Thank you, Miss Johnson. Under committee rule nine, we'll now question witnesses under the five-minute rule. I will now recognize myself for five
minutes. President Agasso uh the current director of the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies and Chi Lin uh was quoted in in 2022
saying this. She said that she believes the FBI, and I quote, has overstated the threat of technology transfer um unquote uh from China because of the type of research that's published. Does this
statement um by Ani Lynn reflect the university's view of threats uh to research security? um and if not what tangible policy reforms have been made at the university particularly in light of the mult
multiple incidents last summer. Thank you uh congressman. Uh my understanding of that statement by an Lynn is that uh she has told others that she was misqued in the statement. Nonetheless, that statement is something
that we don't agree with at all. We find threats from overseas to be a considerable uh point of interest for us that we need to protect against. Uh research security is absolutely fundamental to our mission. Uh uh a few
years ago there was national security presidential memorandum number 33 that was uh put out with regard to protecting our national interests and security. We actually hired the authors of that uh memo to help us build a stronger and
more robust research program. We have a strong program and it continues to get better. For example, let me just tell you some of the things that we do. We've expanded our background checks. We've increased our channels of communications with federal uh agencies. We have improved our data security and physical
security. We require mandatory training of all of our researchers based on NSF secure. the NSF secure uh website which is we follow the the best practices that NSF has uh put out. We prevent conflicts of interest through a process where
everyone is uh is required to disclose and we use a form called M inform. We have comp comprehensive research uh a comprehensive research security program that also includes uh risk management for international collaborations. And I
might uh mention that we use NF's NSF's uh policy on managing international collaborations that was put together with uh the Jason's and MITER Corporation. And I just as a point of interest uh my brother uh was president
of MITER Corporation. So uh national security is incredibly important to both of us in our family uh and we are very committed to national security. >> Okay. Thank you. Um, Miss Farley, um,
some argue that research security efforts risk stereotyping and targeting those who come from different racial uh, or ethnic backgrounds. How do research security efforts at the University of Florida protect faculty and students with all
backgrounds? >> Thank you for that question. At the University of Florida, our new hireer screening of researchers and research support positions occurs for all new hires regardless of national origin or citizenship. We are committed to hiring
the best and the brightest at the University of Florida. So, we use a riskbased review process to review education affiliations, employment history, and ongoing affiliations as well as the nature of the research as we conduct those reviews. We also review
all travel regardless of destination. Um, and all of those things happen within my office and are overseen um by senior leadership. >> Comprehensive, common sense, it appears. Um, thank you, Miss Johnson. You could
write a book about your freshman and sophomore years uh at at Stanford. Um in your in your testimony you mentioned section 117 of the higher education act as well as deterrent uh which this committee moved across the house floor
last year. How does the public transparency in section 117 help you as a citizen and a journalist hold institutions accountable? >> Thank you. Uh, I think the section 117
funding portal has also has already been extremely valuable um to myself and my writers as journalists. Um, I think being able to see uh where Stanford's money is coming from is really important and I think that we have a right to
access that information. >> Okay. It certainly gives um a target for further information to be gained, doesn't it? >> Yeah. Yeah. Well, I wish you well. Um, my time has expired, so I now re recognize the uh gentle lady from
Oregon, Miss Bonamichi, for her five minutes of questioning. >> I I move to represent Representative Tano from California for your five minutes of questioning. >> Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For decades, scholars, researchers, and intellectuals have come to our research institutions because the United States is a global powerhouse scientifically and academically. We take the best and brightest from our allies and adversaries alike and bring
them to study and work for the United States. Our higher education system has been our greatest soft power asset. The benefits are significant. Over a third of Nobel prizes won by the United States were won by foreignb born
researchers and professionals. Among Chinese-born students, over 85% of PhD students stay in the United States long after completing their programs and international scholars contribute tens of billions of dollars a year to our economy. There is no disputing that we
are in the midst of intense competition with China. China is the number one global leader in trade manufacturing, STEM graduates, automation, critical manuals, critical minerals, biotech, biotech, pharmaceuticals, and array of other fields. I agree that the risk of
CCP related intellectual property theft is significant and concerning and it will always continue unless we remain vigilant. However, China is not surpassing us in these areas because they are stealing our technology. China is exceeding uh us
because they have spent years investing in research and development, studying other countries, adopting technology and building universities. They have invested heavily in education. And while they rapidly develop and expand their research infrastructure, this
administration and this majority have hobbled ours. Our universities and colleges have been attacked, demeaned, stripped of their research funding for merely disagreeing with the administration. International students have had their visas arbitrarily revoked without
explanation. Researchers have been targeted, investigated, and publicly accused of crimes they did not commit. And if that sounds like the tactics of an authoritarian CCP, that's because it is. This administration is adopting the very same practices that we decry China
for. In the past, students and scholars came to this country because American higher education was an arena where free speech was not just protected, it was encouraged. Students and professors alike can study, innovate, debate, and collaborate freely. Approaches like the
Safe Research Act, which would restrict colleges from accessing research grant funding if they or the researchers have any affiliation with China, openly attack that model. The proposal is the legislative equivalent of cutting off
the nose despite the face. If we entirely cease all forms of relationship with China in the immediate term, as this administration favors, we give up a significant proportion of our best minds and the workforce in our university researchers and labs. We put for we put
forth an authoritarian response to combat authoritarianism. We also attack some of our best innovators. The unmitigated failures of the China Initiative prove that this heavy-handed approach is not only ineffective, it is incredibly harmful
and highly racially biased. In 2021, Dr. Gang Chin, the former head of MIT's engineering department, was arrested, investigated, and publicly accused of being loyal to China. He had lived and worked in the United States for decades
and been a a citizen for 20 years. After two years of investigation, the charges were dismissed, but not before his research have been halted and his grants have been lost. Years later, he went on to head the development of what is now recognized as the best semiconductor
material yet material yet discovered for its speed and durability. Had the China Initiative succeeded in sending Dr. Chen back to China, the US would not have that technology. The China Initiative has been h has had incredibly tragic consequences as well.
In 2019, Dr. Jane Woo was targeted by a China Initiative investigation. Dr. Woo was a neuroscientist studying cancer and ALS that had been in the and that had been in the US for 40 years and a citizen since uh the year 2000. Dr. Woo
was cleared after two years. But in that time, she lost access to her lab, her research, and her funding. She committed suicide in 2024. When it comes to policymaking, vehements does not equal competence. And rather
than chest beating and name calling, we must pursue solutions that balance both academic freedom and national security. We should strengthen the bipartisan proposals that have been put forth and treat this issue with the gravity it deserves, not use it as another
opportunity for political grandstanding. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. >> I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentle lady from New York. >> Thank you, Chairman Wahberg. Mr. Graasso, last year facing congressional pressure, Michigan ended its partnership
with Shanghai Jaoong University after five Chinese students were caught spying at night and taking illegal photos of US military drills and equipment on the remote Michigan installation Camp Crling. These students lied and misled US law enforcement about their motives and
later conspired on the CCP controlled messaging app WeChat to clear their phones and cameras of photos and evidence. Has the university conducted a full audit to determine what intellectual property or fedally funded research was compromised?
>> Congresswoman, uh we are unaware of any research that was compromised by these individual students. What they did was at Camp Graing uh miles and miles away from campus and they were uh arrested for taking pictures of uh of a military
installation and they were >> while they were students though did you do an audit on whether there was any access to any research being conducted on the university campus? I understand creing is off campus but was there an audit conducted? >> Well, they were they were not
researchers. They were undergraduate students. So, uh, we did not do an audit, but, uh, I suspect that they were not, uh, unless they did something nefarious. They did not have any access to any of our research. >> Well, they did do something nefarious
off-campus. I think it would be important for the university to ensure that there is a full audit conducted to make sure that no research uh, that they didn't take any nefarious acts there. Are there currently any Chinese nationals at Michigan involved in research funded by either the department
of war or any federal agency? >> Uh we have uh many Chinese students and scholars on our campus. I don't know what all their projects are. Uh to your previous point, we will I will take that back to our team and ask them to look at
potential access of those students on our campus. But I do not know what all of our researchers are involved in and whether they are I am I would suspect that some of them are on federal grants. Uh the military and department of
defense has very strict uh requirements as who can participate in their research. So if they're not US citizens, they would not have access. Um, there were also multiple cases of Chinese nationals connected to the university who were charged and arrested for attempting to smuggle biological
materials into the United States last year. What is Michigan doing to vet foreign students? Specifically, what types of reviews are taking place on students from foreign countries who will have access to sensitive research? Uh so uh Congresswoman, we have improved and
we're continuing to improve our background checks for all of our researchers and students that come into the country, but we also have to partner more closely with our federal intelligence community to make sure that these students are vetted before they're allowed to to get visas to enter our country as well.
>> What percentage of students are foreign nationals at Michigan? >> We have about 8,000 uh foreign students or international students out of 75,000. >> Okay. Um, I want to turn Miss Johnson, your testimony is extremely concerning.
Um, thank you for being here and sharing your experience. You mentioned that some of the frustrations you had in Stamford's lack of action to combat the threat of Chinese espionage towards students. Can you characterize your personal interactions with the university, were they cooperative or was the university reluctant to engage with
you? >> Thank you. Uh, the university was very reluctant to engage with me. Um, after we published our first article, there was some outreach. Um, you know, a little email saying they're taking our
concerns seriously and they're looking into it. Um, and we met with some administrators and they, you know, sort of said there there's nothing they can really do about it. Um, so I have definitely sensed that.
>> Did they refer it to law enforcement? No, I had to go to law enforcement myself. >> Um, you also was there any retaliation or backlash from the university against you or Stamford Review where I
understand you were the editor-inchief? >> Yeah, I think among the student body were not uh popular at times and you know, this is definitely one of those cases. Um but it wasn't uh it wasn't terrible beyond
the transnational repression that I was facing. Um campus was okay. The transnational repression though that should not be happening to American undergraduates who are um studying learning their research putting together their academic
portfolio. Um again thanks for being here and bravely sharing your story. Yield back. >> Thank you. >> I thank the gentle lady. I recognize gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for your five minutes of questioning. >> Great. Thank you, uh, Mr. Chairman. And, um, again, if it hasn't already been
stated, again, just for the record, um, you know, this committee, last Congress, uh, held a hearing and a markup on a number of bills regarding this issue. Um, in this Congress, we've gone through the same drill already, a hearing and a markup. Um, I actually voted with the majority in a couple of those measures.
Uh I would just note that they are far from uh through all the wickets in terms of getting through both the House and the Senate. In the meantime, you know, we have a hurricane out there right now with student loan borrowers, which we have not held any hearings to um really
uh conduct oversight, which is within the jurisdiction uh of this um committee. Um, in 2025, student loan delinquencies um skyrocketed uh with nearly 25% of borrowers, roughly 7.9 million Americans
in this country becoming delinquent in the first three quarters alone. Uh by late 2025, over 5.5 million borrowers held 140 billion in defaulted federal loans with severe delinquency rates um hitting 9.6% this year. Um, again, this
is all happening at a time when there's a cost of living crisis. Um, and when this administration let uh the payments snap back um when they took over uh again, it has just been pouring gasoline on the fire. At the same time, we have a
situation over at the Department of Education as um uh our witness um Miss Emry Eris has testified where the whole structure of the federal student loan assistance office is being gutted. Uh and there also because of the
president's um executive order, there's been this sort of quasi transfer of authorities um outside of the Department of Education. Uh again, the announcement that they're shifting uh jurisdiction and control of the portfolio, which is about $2 trillion, out of DOE into the
Treasury Department, I think really deserves our attention in terms of as a committee um to to get to the to the root of this in terms of again the trends that are happening in terms of defaults that are again just um really
going to trap people in a debt trap, particularly young Americans who are starting out in life uh in terms of just uh you know being in a place where they can buy a house or u start a business uh or you know again pursue uh their
dreams. So Miss Emory Aerys uh again your report which uh again I think is was very relevant in terms of again what's happening over the department of education. Can you talk about again the the staffing issues at the office of federal student aid at a time when delinquencies are going through the
roof? >> Certainly. Thank you for that question. We found that between January and December of last year, FSA lost about half of its staff, specifically 46%. That constituted a drop of 656 staff
members. you know, when our constituents, you know, are are again falling into delinquency, uh the ability of even our members of Congress to be able to sort of um try and provide assistance is really um going to, you know, be uh
affected and limited by the fact that there's just not people there to answer the phone. In terms of the transition to to Treasury Department again, can you talk about sort of what we know so far, whether they're just going to shift that office over to do the Treasury or is Treasury going to set up its own um
mechanism? >> We haven't looked into that issue and the department has not discussed it with us. So um again it's um I think may in some sort of uh you know um
conversations in a bar you know people could say oh that sounds like something Treasury can handle is uh handling a portfolio but the fact of the matter is it's like a big bank you know in terms of u you know a loan department that uh DOE has had for for many years um and
certainly Um, I think all of us can attest to the fact that it can always be improved and um, you know, the the confusion that's out there for borrowers in terms of just what in income repayment plans they can qualify for.
Um, you know, they need help um, that's there. But the bottom line is somebody needs to be there to answer the phone, okay, in terms of uh, helping borrowers uh, in the in the predicament that they're in uh, right now. That really should be the focus of this committee given the fact that we've been over this
ground before in terms of the topic of today's hearing. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, we are going to get real clear professional testimony and documentation so that we can help the people we represent. Thank you. I yield back.
>> I thank the gentlemen. Now, back to the topic at hand. I recognize Miss Miller for her five minutes of questioning. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our universities and colleges house vast centers of research and technology that contribute to our national security
framework. The very nature of these centers make them prime targets for espionage, theft, and exploitation. And yet, these universities have repeatedly failed to properly vet foreign students and faculty who seek to
gain access to these facilities. These institutions have also accepted monetary gifts from foreign countries without asking about the strings attached. This committee took a big step forward last year to force donor transparency by
advancing the deterrent act which later passed the house. Similarly, the Trump administration has also taken action to ensure further compliance of section 117 of the Higher Education Act. But there
is more work to be done because many universities fail to self-report. There must be stricter civil and criminal penalties for improper vetting of foreign students and faculty. The same is true for foreign gifts. In
fact, universities should have to report all foreign gifts, regardless of the amount or the nation it was received from. Safeguarding our national security involves holding these colleges and universities accountable. My first
question is to Mr. Graasso. Last year, two Chinese nationals who worked in a lab at the University of Michigan were charged with smuggling a dangerous fungus into the United States. What steps have you taken to prevent foreign agents like these from
infiltrating your college again? Thank you, uh, Congresswoman. Uh, we are, uh, have been developing stronger background checks for all of our scholars and researchers. We require uh, our train mandatory training in terms of
uh, research security of all of our uh, researchers. Research security is fundamental to our mission. We take uh these these breaches very very seriously. We have uh improved uh many of our research protocols. We have very strong protocols and we continue to
improve them along with uh annual uh training as I mentioned. We uh also in rely heavily on our um federal partners to help us identify individuals that are coming in that could pose threats to to
our national security and when they issue visas. And we continue to uh uh look at export controls, foreign engagements. As I mentioned, we check all of our foreign engagements and we do all of our reporting according to
section 117 of the Higher Education Act. Okay. Well, we're going to hold you accountable for that. My next question is to Miss Farley. In your written testimony, you mentioned several Florida laws designed to reduce undue foreign influence in colleges and universities.
Could you talk about the effectiveness of these laws and how we might implement similar policies on a federal level? >> Thank you for that question, Representative. I would of course have to defer to policy makers to as to the best approach to regulating institutes
of higher education. But at the University of Florida, we have a highly compliant program. We have fully committed to complying with all state and federal regulations related to research security. The statutes in question um require that the University
of Florida screen all new research and research support positions um prior to hire. Our institution also has implemented an international travel review program in which travelers must report their travel prior to traveling. It must be reviewed by my office and they must certify compliance um with
relevant policies and regulations. And in addition to that, there are several reporting requirements in which the university reports foreign gifts and contracts to the Florida Board of Governors on a regular basis to include on any agreements with um countries of concern. So what enforcement um policies
h are in place >> um in in what sense? >> Well, if a college or university violates those. >> Absolutely. So the the Florida Board of Governors requires reporting um of these agreements on a bi-annual basis. Um and
then there are consequences in place. I don't have the ex exact language of the statute in front of me um if there is a lack of reporting or transparency. So, the board of governors is highly involved in oversight and monitoring of compliance. >> Do you know of any situations where
you've had to um force some kind of compliance or find a university or take some kind of punitive action? >> So, I can only speak for the University of Florida, but our program is highly compliant and we've had a variety of outcomes from the reviews that we do in
compliance with the Florida Board of Governor's Regulation. >> Well, thank you. Florida's been such a light in the country. I appreciate what you've all done. My last question, >> gentle lady's time is expired. >> Okay. Thank you. >> If you wouldn't have explained about Florida so strongly,
>> member Michigan. >> Okay. >> Uh now I uh recognize the gentle lady from Florida, uh Miss Wilson for five minutes of questioning. >> Thank you. Thank you, Chair Wahberg and Ranking Member Scott.
But I just have to ask, what problem are we actually trying to solve today? Why are we here? Where is the evidence that America's universities are under siege by foreign
espionage at a scale that justifies this level of alarm? And while we're asking questions, why aren't we holding hearings on the real crisis facing students?
This is the education committee and we should be ashamed that we are not examining how by dismantling the department of education, slashing oversight and gutting federal
student aid in the socalled big ugly bill. Republicans have made college less affordable, less accessible, and harder to finish, especially for low and middle inome
families. Who is truly putting students at risk? this hypothetical foreign actor or policies that gut federal student aid
and undermine the Department of Education? How does slashing support for PEL grants and loan programs strengthen higher education or our workforce? Instead of chasing xenophobic conspiracy
theories that risk stigmatizing international students and distracting from real problems, this committee should be focused on holding the administration accountable for the chaos
and confusion it is inflicting on borrowers and on institutions and on advancing serious legislation that ensures every single student in
this country who wants to can access and complete a quality degree. With that, I have a few questions. Miss Emory Aris, how have the changes to the federal
student loan access and repayment in HR1, the so-called big ugly bill, affected the affordability of higher education for low and middle inome students who depend on federal aid to
enroll and stay in school. >> Thank you for the question. We have not studied that issue, but we would be happy to do so in the future. >> Okay. Well, last week the Department of Education announced that it will
transfer the Office of Federal Student Aid to the Treasury Department. Do you know how this how will this shift of student loan management responsibilities affect students daytoday lives as
borrowers? for example, the clarity of information they receive, the quality of of uh customer service, and the ease of navigating repayment and default. >> That is a good question. We have not studied the issue and we do not know the
answer. >> But you're here at this committee and you don't know the answer to nothing. >> I can tell you about the Gentle lady yields. Thank the gentle lady. Now I recognize the gentle lady
from Michigan, Miss McClean. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses who are here today. I think the purpose of this hearing today is to make sure that if we are engaged with foreign countries,
especially foreign adversaries, that we want to make sure that our country and our students are safe from espionage. We don't want our intellectual property to be stolen. Um, and we want to safeguard
the institutions in which the taxpayers spend a lot of money funding. So I believe that's what the purpose of this hearing is for. So let me um ask a general question is maybe let's start
with this. Why do you believe foreign relationships um at the university level are important? Right. Right? We have a lot of taxpayers paying money for taxes uh for their for their students to go uh to
our universities. Why are the relationships with foreign countries, especially foreign adversaries, why are those relationships even needed? And and I'll ask both the university presidents. We'll start with you. >> Uh thank you, Congresswoman. Uh first,
it's not about foreign talent in isolation. At the University of Michigan, we are one of the greatest universities in the world. And we want to attract the best talent from around the world to come and work with our researchers and study with our students
to the benefit of humanity. And we uh we understand that the majority of the university is funded through Michigan taxpayer dollars. That's why if we invite students from other states or from other uh overseas, they pay a differential to compensate for the
difference that taxpayers get a discount on. But we are not necessarily uh existentially dependent on international talent, but it is to the university's benefit and to society's benefit to attack attract the best and the brightest to the university to develop
the best technologies and a future for the university. Miss Barley, >> thank you for that question. At the University of Florida, in compliance with state statutes, we review all international agreements regardless of funding source. At our institution, we're committed to finding the
appropriate collaborators for our research. Um, but all agreements go under um a thorough review by the appropriate office. Um but as a matter of statute we do not enter into any agreements with foreign countries of concern without the prior approval of the board of governors.
>> Is it necessary to have foreign countries in these relationships and these partnerships knowing that there is a risk of espionage of intellectual property being being stolen? It is it really necessary? >> Um thank you for that question. that in
my role as the research security officer um I am responsible for reviewing these agreements ensuring the risk is um as minimal as possible and when at all possible ensuring that that risk doesn't exist >> so you can't really comment on my question okay all right um what I'm
curious about is what happens and can you walk us through to to give us a little piece of mind what happens today if a researcher fails to disclose a foreign affiliation. We'll start with you, Miss Farley. We'll go in reverse order.
>> Thank you for that question. Representative, at the University of Florida, our policy on conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment um prohibits participation and malign foreign talent recruitment programs. That's a um explicit prohibition, but um
and all all employees are required to disclose outside activities. >> But what happens if they don't? So if they violate our policy, um our institution um follows our policy to do a thorough review to determine if there was a violation of our policy and then
there is a process in place to conduct that review. >> Is there a zero tolerance policy? >> If there's a violation of our policy, then we would find we would follow the um laid out disciplinary actions within within that policy. Yes. >> And what would that disciplinary action
be? depending on the scope of the um depending on the scope of their non-compliance um disciplinary action can be anything from um counseling to ter up to termination >> counseling. Okay, Mr. Graasso.
>> Uh thank you, Congresswoman. I think our program would be similar. We would do an investigation if there was an oversight and and disclosure of a conflict of interest and the the penalties would be commensurate with the oversight. If it was a simple oversight of uh perhaps an
honorary title at a university that was not listed on someone's uh disclosure form, we would have a conversation with the individual. If there's a compensation associated with it, it could be up to termination, which we did do in a particular instance that we
found. Thank you very much. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. >> I thank the gentle lady. Now I recognize the gentle lady from Michigan, Miss Stevens. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our witnesses here today. And great to see you, President Graasso. Go
Blue. Um, we know we're all in uh challenging times for higher education. Um, as many of my colleagues have pointed out, faculty, administrators, researchers, and most importantly, students have been caught up in the
current administration's reckless dismantling of federal agencies as well as cuts to uh, research funding that have changed the landscape of uh, university and academic life dramatically. I also have the privilege
of sitting on the house science, space and technology committee and the select committee on strategic competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. And so this uh hearing today has is cutting across a
lot of uh the policy work that I have engaged in and on Congress and that the committees of uh jurisdiction that I also sit on have have tackled. We know that the research ecosystem across our universities is uh one of the crown
jewels of this country and that American national security economic innovations, critical health breakthroughs and so much more often starts at the university research level or technology readiness
uh one or zero through five. So the the research is going to be a target and we know that for our adversaries and our competitors. Uh however the response is not to close off you know our universities uh to to the world. We know
that we don't want to be launching uh xenophobic attacks uh against particular student communities or cut off critical federal research funding. uh and instead we should adopt common sense protections like the ones codified in my United
States Research Protection Act that passed the House on Voice vote last year. And we want to give our universities the tools to protect themselves and secure important research without jeopardizing the funding and collaborations they need to remain on
the cutting edge. And most importantly, we do want to uh protect academic integrity and research uh from foreign influence uh which is somewhat in the camp of espionage, but we don't want to
have the influence. And so, you know, when we see the current administration firing workers and shuttering directorates at the NSF, the National Science Foundation, um many of those fired were experienced professionals in managing federal research funding uh
securely and they were attuned to the risk posed by mal maligned malign foreign actors. And so it's safe to say that eliminating that institutional knowledge made it more difficult for universities to maintain their security of their research operations. And to
that end, Mr. U Graasso, what more can we do at the federal level to help the University of Michigan uh secure the critical research happening on your campus? >> Thank you, uh, Congresswoman. We uh
would we appreciate our partnership with uh federal agencies, both our funding agencies and our security and law enforcement agencies, and we appreciate any uh information that can be shared with regard to uh interactions with
foreign entities that would help us better protect our policies. >> Yeah. And do you have any um research highlights that are going on at the University of Michigan right now to make sure that our state is on the cutting edge of new innovations? Anything you'd like to share right now? >> Oh, we have a lot of research
highlights. As a matter of fact, just recently uh the first uh uh or awards by Sony and Nature magazine for the top women in technology and science were awarded. They awarded three of them. two were uh
Michigan scholars and they happened to also be of Chinese origin. So that was terrific and one of those was for work that was done in the development of a technology called histatriy which is a a treatment of liver cancer for and it
does surgery without heat or scalpels. So it uses ultrasound and it was just sold for almost $3 billion. So that's one of the terrific things that we're doing on campus. >> Well, holy smokes, because we know we want these innovations and this
productivity here in our country, particularly as we face enormous challenges with our debt proposition. And it's only when we innovate and grow our economy, that we will uh be able to pay off our debt. So, thank you so much for being here and sharing. And with
that, Mr. Chair, I yield back. >> I thank the gentle lady. I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Allen >> Georgia, excuse me, from Georgia. >> It's down south. Down south there somewhere, right? >> Yeah, it's close to Florida. Yeah. Right
next we we neighbor Florida. >> I get wrapped up. >> We're proud to neighbor Florida. Thank you. >> Uh but and thank you, Chairman, for holding this important uh uh hearing today. And I want to thank the witnesses for your uh attendance and expertise and
helping us understand uh what's going on in American universities and as far as the engine of engine of innovation, collaboration, but those strengths obviously are being exploited by foreign adversaries who work to undermine our
institutions and democratic values. You know, we are the innovation giant in the world. The problem is that uh you know much of that innovation is uh being intellectual capital is being uh stolen and used
against us particularly from an economic standpoint. President Graasso according to the University of Michigan's export control training only one module named export control is labeled required. Nine other modules are deemed optional,
including export compliance and biosafety, export compliance for international shipping and export compliance and the United States sanctions program. Do you believe having those trainings only be optional for university faculty and staff is taking a
strong and proactive approach towards research security? >> Uh, Congressman, thank you very much for that question. research security is our uh fundamental basis for doing our research and I will actually take your
comment back to our team in Ann Arbor and I will look at those other modules that are labeled as optional and we will look to see if we can make those required as appropriate. Thank you. >> Thank you. Uh, Miss Farley, you noted concerns about undisclosed participation
in foreign talent programs, particularly those linked to the People's Republic of China with PA uh, which includes taxpayer funded research dollars. How does the University of Florida's screening process identify and mitigate risk associated with undisclosed foreign
affiliations? >> Thank you for that question, Representative. At the University of Florida, we require um all new research and research support positions to go through a screening process. That screening process looks for a variety of indicators, some of which are can be
indicators of malign foreign government talent recruitment programs. So our office looks at things such as employment history, foreign affiliations, publication history as well as education and training. And we also consider the nature of the research and the scope of the research for the
researcher we are looking at. >> Okay. Good. And you think that's working to satisfactory protect to secure what you're doing there at the great University of Florida? >> At UF, we believe our program is in compliance with the statutes and that it is effectively implemented. Yes.
>> Great. Thank you. Miss Johnson, you mentioned student groups such as the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations that are utilized as arms of the Chinese government. Can you talk about what type of events these organizations hold and how they influence other international students
on campus? >> Yeah. So, Stanford has an associ association of Chinese students and scholars. Uh, it receives I think last year it received $64,000 from Stanford as club funding and they
host a lot of networking events across the Bay Area and their big event every year is their uh Lunar New Year party. Um and the association of Chinese students and scholars has been used to
um used for peer monitoring and reporting back to the Chinese Communist Party which I think creates an unsafe environment for a lot of uh Chinese students. What about the influence they're having on other international students and
meaning um are they trying to recruit other international students into this effort or um h how has that how has that influence caused a problem? >> I'm not sure if they're trying to recruit other international students.
However, I have heard stories from um people in our business school who are also in the US military who have attended events hosted by uh Chinese clubs where they've been invited to, you
know, go to China for free, have been approached about what they're doing with the US military. Um so definitely is affecting uh US American students, right? uh as well as Taiwanese students because oftentimes um there will be a stance against
>> so this would be an espionage effort by that group. Okay. All right. Well, thank you very much. Uh I am out of time. Uh Mr. Chairman, I yield back. >> I thank the gentleman and I do apologize. How could I think of moving you out of the home of the masters terminant uh coming up in a couple
weeks? Maybe it's jealousy. >> Yes. Well, yes, it's two weeks away and we're looking forward to it and it's 80 degrees in Augusta, Georgia today. Thank you. You've said too much right now. So, I thank the gentleman. Now, I recognize the gentleman gent gentle lady from
Oregon, Miss Bonamichi. >> Uh, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again to the witnesses. I I appreciate my colleagues dedication to this issue, and I and I just wish that they brought the same level of commitment to addressing uh problems in our higher education system like the
cost of college and meeting the basic needs of students. Recently, the GAO published a report about the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights. That's the office that's charged with enforcing civil rights laws that protect more than 70 million students in schools
and universities nationwide. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has slashed this office, laid off about half the staff, closed seven of the 12 regional offices, and then several months later, uh, OCR then recalled about 250 of the laid-off staff to
address the backlog of civil rights complaints. Reports in January show that OCR failed to meaningfully resolve a single racial harassment or discrimination investigation since Donald Trump took office in January of 2025. Then more than a month ago, 70 of
my Democratic colleagues joined me in sending a letter to Secretary McMahon and Assistant Secretary Richie. We need answers. We asked about the current number of pending cases and open investigations, how many full-time workers, OCR employees, how many remain on paid administrative leave, and
whether OCR has resolved any cases related to racial harassment or discrimination of students. We requested answers within 30 days. We have heard nothing. It's been 50 days, no response. Miss Emory Ars GAO released a report in
January investigating the reduction in force and restructuring at OCR. What effect did the riffs have on the case load of the employees who remained at OCR and what were the circumstances that led to the department re recognizing that they needed to reinstate some of
those employees? So, as you noted, the um the department cut about half of the OCR staff during this time um dating back to March. Um and during this period, from March through September, they had more than 9,000 complaints of alleged
discrimination. They opened more than 600 investigations. They reported resolving about 7,000 complaints and they noted that about 90% of the resolutions were through dismissals. So they just dismiss the cases rather than
resolve them is what you're saying. Um are there can be many reasons for dismissals and the department has not disclosed what those reasons are. >> And what was the cost to American taxpayers of placing OCR employees on paid administrative leave as part of the
riff? And then what was the cost of recalling them uh later in the year to address the backlog of civil rights complaints? That's an excellent question and we don't know the answer because the department didn't do what it was supposed to do. The department was supposed to calculate those costs before
initiating the riffs. It did not. Um, however, we do know based on estimates that they had for just simply the benefits and the salaries that between 28.5 and 38 million was spent from March
to December paying people not to work. >> Yeah. That that is not government efficiency. when we pay people not to work. Um, and and I I just want to note, uh, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, that uh, you know, Miss Johnson, I'm sorry I missed your testimony that you gave
orally, but I I read through your testimony, and you certainly don't don't agree with what happened to you, but I talk to people all the time about higher education, and what I'm hearing is, I don't know if I can afford to go to college. I don't know what's going to happen with my student loans. I have so
much student loan debt. I don't know what to do with all the changes in the program. It's confusing. We don't know what's going to happen. Now they're trying to send the student loan collection to Treasury without the appropriate staff or expertise. That's what people are talking to me about. Uh
we have we passed legislation. We've had hearings multiple hearings on the threat to research security both here and in the science committee and from the testimony from the institutions as I said earlier they are addressing those threats. What we really need to deal with is the attack on higher education
and we're not doing that in this committee and Mr. Chairman I hope we can do that uh because uh higher education is a path to opportunity and we need to open those doors of opportunity not close them. I have said that HR1 the big ugly bill I call it is a dream killer
because there are a lot of people now who just feel like they won't be able to afford to go to college unless they're from a wealthy family. that's taking opp uh opportunity away from people which is exactly the opposite of what President Johnson when he signed the higher education act said this is to open the
doors of opportunity that's what this committee should be doing opening doors of opportunity for students across the country and making sure that if people have student loan debt they have a manageable way to pay it back instead of thrusting him into the chaos that is about to erupt at the Treasury and I I
yield back Mr. I thank the gentle lady and I would note that uh we concur with your desire to encourage higher education. We see see different approaches but we certainly want to encourage higher education. Let's move now uh to the
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Mtorimemer for your five minutes of questioning. >> Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the witnesses for being here today. Uh, President Graasso, when you when universities are faced with potential criminal activity by foreign nationals, cooperation with law enforcement cannot be optional or
delayed. Timely action is essential to to ensure those that break the laws are held accountable without exception. Yet, at the University of Michigan, we have seen a case of at least two foreign nationals on student visas who were able to flee the United States and remain fugitives. This cannot happen again, and
I hope you agree. I had a provision included on the House passed the deterrent act last March that would strengthen coordination between universities and federal agencies to asssure compliance, streamline reporting, and close gaps that let bad actors slip through the hands of law
enforcement. What concrete steps will the University of Michigan take to work directly with federal agencies to improve reporting and prevent future cases from falling through the cracks? >> Uh, thank you, Congressman. When we get a report from federal agency of uh
transgression in our laws, we take immediate action. And as I mentioned, we've had several instances where federal agents identified students that were doing uh illicit things. We revoked their visas right away and uh and then
uh they were uh they were I I either arrested or uh some of them left the country. But we uh take immediate action when we are uh faced with illicit action that's reported to us by the federal federal authorities.
>> All right. Thank you, Miss Johnson. Do you feel like Stanford has support systems in place for students like yourself who are experiencing transnational repression? >> Uh no, I don't think Stanford has uh the proper infrastructure in place. I think
they have been sort of helpful with uh you know our program for international students but not on the transnational repression front. >> What what uh steps can they what practive steps can they take to help students?
>> I think they should try to set up an anonymous tip line for people to report incidents. uh and I think they should uh set up even a small office for um students to talk to administrators about this issue.
>> Thank you. Miss Farley, you describe the University of Florida as a model for centralized instit institutionwide research security and oversight. What advantage uh is there to having a centralized compliance functions uh compared to decentralized approaches
that other universities might be using? Thank you for that question, Representative. Um, as I'm sure you can imagine, the University of Florida is a large place um with many colleges and centers and institutes. So, by centralizing our research security program, we were able to ensure that we
could implement an effective and efficient program with minimal numbers of points of contact to make it easier for researchers, faculties, and students to know who their central point of contact is. Um, we've also been able to ensure by centralizing these programs that there is direct oversight from
senior leadership, so members of the University of Florida cabinet. >> Okay, thank you. That's all the questions I have. I'll yield back my time. >> I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentle lady from Pennsylvania, Miss Lee. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It feels like this hearing is yet another uh of the Republicans's latest attempts to to vitalize the global community and undermine higher education. universities already put significant resources and efforts into making sure their hiring, enrollment,
and research processes are safe. Um, but conservatives would have us believe that espionage is one of the largest issues facing higher education and that we should treat every international student or faculty faculty as a foreign spy. The
research universities in my district like uh the University of Pittsburgh uh Carmel uh Carnegie Melon University are great because not despite of uh the international community. Dr. Graasso, in your testimony, you mentioned that your university's achievements are made
possible by the ability to attract the best and brightest from every corner of the United States and the world. How does your university benefit from enrolling international students and hiring international faculty? >> Uh thank you, Congresswoman. That is a a great question. We uh attract the best
and the brightest from around the world and they come and they enrich our our campuses because they not only bring their their intellectual power but they bring different perspectives from around the world and how different cultures and communities look at different problems
and that helps our our students learn from them as they sit side by side in classrooms and it helps our researchers attack very difficult problems from different perspectives. So we have benefited greatly from uh an international community of the best and
the brightest. And Time magazine just ranked the University of Michigan the ninth best university in the world. There were only four other American universities ahead of us. They were privates. We were the first public, but we were ranked the ninth best. And it's
in part because we can attract the best and the brightest. >> Thank you. So, it sounds like diversity, equity, and inclusion uh do make universities great. I do. And I and and I and I try to be sensitive because I recognize that a lot of our university presidents who have come before our
committee. They have um brought uh some concerns about speaking out in front of or around this administration, in front of Republicans. We know that Trump has made it clear uh that he intends to use the full force of the federal government including this committee to go after some of our university uh presidents and
our institutions. This administration threatens the existence of our higher education institutions. And perhaps I know you all can't always say it. So I will say it for you, but I am grateful that you have come uh to share this perspective. That is a really important one. If Republicans want to protect research, they can stop cutting research
funding. they can make sure um that the NIH and the NSF are fully staffed and with scientific experts, experts who make decisions based on research integrity instead of fascist ideology uh and conspiracy theories, visa delays, travel restrictions, increased security
or surveillance, kidnappings from ICE, heightened UN uncertainty, and the chilling effect caused by hearings just like this one are what actually make it impossible for schools to fulfill their educational and research missions. Every bit of innovation that contributes to our position in the world has come from
innovation through global collaboration. Congressman Takano mentioned it, but it bears repeating that our ability to attract the best and the brightest from all corners of this country and the world uh is what is comprises America's soft power. It's not just what makes us
globally competitive. It's what makes us globally safe. We should be proud of the fact that people all over the world want to come here. That we have built a societ a society that people want to contribute to. If they no longer feel welcome here, they will take their
talents elsewhere. They'll use their skills to build up the world around us and we will be left behind. We have an administration that does not value soft power. there does not feel there is a benefit to diplomacy that doesn't value
our country's image as helpers or aspiring peacekeepers in the world. This administration is hell bent on making America look like a hellscape. This is the trajectory we are on. And to add insult to injury, when xenophobic rhetoric about foreign espionage causes
students to be profiled and discriminated against, what recourse do they have? Because in January, we learned that the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights has been dismissing. 90% of discrimination complaints. And this was while half of the OCR staff were placed on administrative uh leave thanks to Doge.
Very quickly, Miss Emory uh Aerys, can you remind this committee what the Department of Education spent on civil rights staff who were not allowed to work from March to December 2025? >> We know it was at least 28.5 to $35 million. So instead of paying civil rights workers to do their job in
pro in process discrimination cases, the department of ed spent millions of taxpayer dollars to strip students of civil rights protections. We know that world-class universities are in global collaborations are essential to democracy, which is of course what this administration is attacking in the first place. But we cannot allow for xenophobic rhetoric can't get lost in
it. Um, those of us who are still interested in democracy will continue to fight for international students, for the contributions to our country, and we'll continue to fight against the kind of for the kind kind of global democracy and diplomacy that so many of our greatest achievements were built on. I thank you all so much for your time and >> gentle lady's time has expired, and now
I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Fine. >> Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, I live in the real world, not the world of sunshine, rainbows, pixie dust, and unicorns that we just heard about. So, I'd like to give you some examples before I get to my question to Miss Farley. In 2021, this isn't fictional, a
the federal G grand jury indicted Lin Yang for defrauding the NIH of 1.75 million. He concealed his ties to a Chinese company while he was working with the University of Florida. He fled to China. Between 2019 and 2021,
multiple UF researchers resigned or were terminated after internal audits revealed undisclosed connections to Chinese institutions or talent programs. In 2024, a UF research lab employee and several students were implicated in a multi-year plot related to biochemical
and toxin shipping at UCF. Four professors between 2019 and 2020 had ties to China, had to be resigned or fired amid concerns of undisclosed relationships. At the University of South Florida in 2015, Dejene Ping ran
UCF's Confucious Institute um had to had expense fraud, visa issues that had to be dealt with. And I could go on and on and on. These are issues in my state that actually take these issues seriously. again as opposed to the sunshine rainbow pixie dust perspective
that we just heard. That's why in 2021 the Florida legislature passed HB77017 unanimously to deal with these issues and in 2023 SB846 and I was proud to help spearhead both of those when I was in the legislature helping to run
education policy. So, Miss Farley, my question to you is this. Do you believe that the issue we're dealing with, we're talking about here is a real issue? And have policies like the ones we put in place in Florida helped you to be able to make sure that we are protecting our
research institutions to advance the interests of the American people? >> Thank you for that question, Representative. At the University of Florida, we are fully committed to complying with all policies and regulations related to this important issue. And as you've stated, we had some
examples of significant breaches of trust at the university and we were committed to cooperating fully and um those employees are no longer at the institution. We have implemented. >> So these things actually happen. >> These issues so they're real. We're not like making it up. Yes. And and by the
way, all the examples I gave were basically China. But but these are these are happening. Like we need someone to have the job that you have. Now, obviously you're going to say yes, but because you want your job, but we we need we have an issue and we need someone like you to deal with it.
>> The institution takes this issue very seriously and we um at the time that the laws were passed, we um implemented a task force of senior leaders across the institution. We took it very seriously. the um leaders across the institution designed the research security program
which has since grown and evolved to um implement the new requirements as well that were passed in 2023. We centralized the program so that there's leadership oversight of these programs and we've done significant outreach and training across campus to help our cap partners, our researchers, our faculty understand
the importance of these issues and the importance of complying with federal and state regulations. So, let's hypothetically assume that we lived in the world of rainbows, pixie dust, unicorns that that we heard about where everything's fine and we're all working together and we don't need to take any of this stuff seriously. We hadn't
passed these laws like we passed in Florida and we had the kinds of issues. What are some What do you think would be going on in our institutions if we weren't worried about it? If we weren't passing laws like we passed in Florida? Do you believe that our our Florida universities would be at risk or
everything would just be fine? I would hesitate to speculate on a hypothetical, but what I will say is that the concerns are concerns we've seen at the federal level as well as the state level. And the university has been committed for many many years to
constantly improving our compliance posture and and growing our research security program to protect those and be a good steward of federal research dollars. >> My last question is this. Do you believe that there are foreign actors that wish to exploit our universities whe and and
the funding that we provide to them for the benefit of their countries as opposed to the United States? I am far from an expert on intelligence, but I can say that based on interactions I've had with my colleagues and
professional organizations, we've heard um many we've been given a lot of information at universities regarding the potential threats of undue foreign influence and the best ways to protect the research enterprise and the instit and the University of Florida is absolutely committed to protecting the
research enterprise >> and I appreciate the work that you do. These issues are real. We need to accept that they are real. How we deal with them we can disagree with. But the fact of the matter is we do have the best research universities in the world. And if we don't take these threats seriously, we won't end up having the best research universities in the world.
I'm grateful for Florida leading the way as we usually do. Hopefully the other 49 states can follow and we can. >> Gentleman's time has expired. >> Thank you. >> Chairman I recognize the gentleman from California with great knowledge about Stanford. Uh, Mr. D. Sonier.
>> Thank you, Mr. Wahlberg. Although I used to be a resident and had a restaurant in PaloAlto, I am now representing a district and have lived it for a long time in the East Bay. Um, and spend a lot of time with the number one public rated consistently public university in
the United States, the University of California, and have many of their employees and alumni in my district. And I also have three national labs in the area. So this is um in terms of what really happened and I'm reminded after
listening to uh comments just made that uh George Santiana's quote about for those who forget history they're condemned to repeat it. I'm reminded in my area I have a friend multiple friends who were interned um during the
Japanese internment. Um, one in particular is in his 90s now and tells stories as a kid coming back and asking where's dad and dad had died at TB. I'm also reminded as a Californian of the Chinese inclusionary exclusionary act.
So, um, we need to remember history, Mr. Chairman, and while I absolutely agree and have had conversations within the last two months at the National Laboratory of Berkeley about a lot of work they're doing on AI, remarkable work. Um but it's also reflected of the
diversity in that institution and welcoming great minds irrespective of where they came from and their country of origin or are. So it's interesting just hearing this that and I know Mr. chairman, you feel the same way that we
want diversity, but we also want to protect um these wonderful institutions that I work with and um having many friends at Stanford and I'm sorry you had the experience and I'd love to know more because they should have been more responsive because it's not about ideology, it's about protecting these
resources and part of that protection is welcoming diversity. Um so uh Miss Emory Aris I have first question is along these lines um at the GIO has reported in on a a number of things access to
federal student aid very important that you've done work on that reflects diversity and opportunity and merit uh but let me start with the closing of seven of 12 offices of office of civil rights by the administration and the effect that might have on continuing to
have people get into our universities um who are the best and the brightest irrespective of their their um country of origin. We know from our work that they closed
seven offices um for uh the offices of civil rights regional offices. Those were Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco. >> Right. San Francisco is ours. We also know that they paid people not to work.
They did that for many months and those people were not able to process discrimination uh complaints during that time because they were prohibited from doing so. >> And that cost according to your report was $38 million of lost revenue to
taxpayers where people weren't allowed to work. Um and 90% of the complaints on civil rights were were not addressed. >> That's true. And I just want to clarify, I misspoke a moment ago when I said it was up to 35 million. It was higher. You are correct. It was up to 38 million.
>> I always love to correct somebody from OVR. It's a rare occasion. Uh let's talk about um the office of federal student aid. So getting young students who don't have financial capacity to be able to get in into these universities. Uh f
federal funding by this administration was cut by almost 50% and you've done work on that as well. So could you speak to that in the ability to get talented people to be able to get into higher education again irrespective of their
background. >> Right. So the office of federal student aid as its name says manages everything with student aid. Uh they manage federal grants, loans, work study funds to support students attending over 5,000
colleges. Um, and we know that between January and December of last year, they cut almost half of that of their staff, 46%. So, Mr. Chairman, I I just like to conclude and I don't want to be
responsive to the previous question. Um but being diligent about making sure we protect our institutions I completely agree with and have had conversations with people um at the national labs and at our universities including Stanford about how we do that. But we have to be
really mindful and I know you are Mr. Chairman about um prejudice and racism and how it affects real people and how it affects these institutions in a negative way. So, I'll be happy to work with you um to make sure that we do both
of those things. Protect um espionage or foreign influence from people who are are maybe well our adversaries, but also not do it at a way at um people who we remember our history that unfortunately in our country we have sometimes um
scapegoated loyal Americans based on their ethnicity. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yel back. >> Thank you. Gentleman's time is expired. I appreciate your concern. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Utah, the vice chairman of this uh committee, Mr.
Owens. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um it's no secret Chinese government is a real important rival to the United States. The exploding openness of our higher education system by manipulating their citizens, influencing our institutions, and still taxpayer funded research that
often has national security implications. In many cases, institutions and researchers may unknowingly and unwittingly help the CCP by not properly vetting foreign faculty and students that have ties to to the Chinese government and um and military.
However, there are some cases where colleges and researchers are willingly willing to accept the foreign influence and risk national security as a as a price of doing business with the CCP. They do so in order to advance their research, their careers, or simply out
of greed. For those who prioritize wealth, power, and fame by prioritizing our adversary, the Communist Chinese Party, over the health and welfare of our nation, there's one word for that. It's called traitors. They will eventually be discarded by the communist regime once they no longer in value to
them. But it's imperative that those of us who love our country and love the freedom that uh for our kids and our future that we never forget who these traitors are. They need to be held legally accountable for the threat they pose to our nation. But they also need to ensure that they'll never forgotten to history as their names are read by
our children alongside other traders like Benedict Benedict Arnold in the 1950s Rosenbergs. It's time to make the word traitor fearful again. Um Dr. Graasso, first I want to thank you for your for your military service and
leadership. I think for the the small period of time that that University of Michigan uh has you for them it should be a very good way of bringing us back to old school American loyalty. and I'm I'm excited to see what you can do in the time you're there. Um, in uh July 2025, the Department of Education opened
a section 117 compliance investigation into the University of Michigan. That in investigation found that just in the last 5 years, 86 million of the university's foreign gifts and contracts reports were submitted late. This totals equals 20% of the university's gifts and
contracts over that lifetime. Many reports are also mislabeled. Section 117 has been in law for over 30 years. Can you explain how such a high amount of foreign funds were not reported correctly? >> Thank you, Congressman. We are uh also
concerned that we were not reporting our our funding as a as required and as as appropriate and we've improved our procedures and protocols and now we're catching things that were we were not reporting and I think we're we're getting very close to being caught up. At the same time, the Department of
Education was changing their protocols as well. So, we were trying to keep up with what they were doing and we've improved our protocols. So, we're we're caught up. I do want to point out though, I know that there's a lot of concern about China, but uh in terms of our foreign funding, China falls into
sixth place at our university in terms of funding anything on our campus. So, we have uh countries ahead of China are Switzerland, Japan, the UK, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. So those countries uh fall in front of China. We only have uh $86
million that we reported through section 117 of close to a billion dollars. >> Okay. Thank you. Thank you so much. Miss Farley, you emphasize a top- down approach to research security involving deans and department chairs. Uh how critical is leadership engagement and in establishing a compass a campus culture
of research uh security compliance? We have found it to be very critical to the success of our program at the University of Florida. Um at each point that we have implemented a new aspect of the research security program. My office in partnership with other offices
engaged with deans, chairs and other leaders across campus to explain the program, its requirements and the importance of complying with state and federal regulations. We have found that this has helped um make sure that employees, faculty and staff across the
institution understand those rules and have the information they need to thoroughly comply. >> Thank you. Uh Miss Johnson, uh the Stanford has an office of the vice provo for institutional equity, access, and community. The website's uh office
official website says committed to ensuring the Stanford community members safely thrive in an environment free of violence and harassment. Uh did this uh DEI of office help in uh in your process of going as you were getting harassed and intimidated by foreign nationals?
>> No, they didn't help me. >> Uh did you hear from this DEI office at all during this period of time? >> No. >> Okay. I just want I want to say this. Uh, first of all, we're so proud to to hear from young people like yourself. I want to say I'm sure your parents are very proud to see what you're standing
for. And this is what old school American loyalty and courage looks like. So, uh, it gives us a lot of excitement about seeing the future of our country. We see young people like yourself standing where you are. So, thank you so much for that. And, uh, I yield back. >> I thank the gentleman. I recognize the
gentle lady from Arizona, Miss Grahava. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for all of you for being here. Um, while the majority focuses today on hearing on foreign in and today's hearing on foreign influence, the most immediate threat to the students and families that I represent in Arizona's seventh
congressional district is Trump's administration systemic dismantling of the Department of Education. Through the big, horrible bill and reckless reductions in force, this administration has made pursuing higher education less affordable, less accessible, and far
more chaotic for millions of Americans. We should also be f we should be focused on ensuring everyone can access a quality degree rather than chasing overblown concerns and conspiracy theories that often fuel xenophobic rhetoric on our campuses and target
international students and students of color. So, as of December 2025, there are 7.7 million borrowers with defaulted federal loans. As this administration continues to make life harder for low and middle-income families, it is
critical to provide highquality, robust support for defaulted borrowers. So, I was extremely upset to see that the department's recent announcement to move the servicing of defaulted loans to the Treasury Department as a first step to dismantle the Office of Federal Student Aid, which I know will have an effect on
many of my constituents in Arizona's seventh congressional district. Miss Emory Eris, um, are you able to speak to any insight you have on how the department typically supports defaulted borrowers? I can say that typically what happens is
a borrower is put into default when they have not made a payment in more than 270 days. And the risks at that point are significant. They lose access to additional federal student aid. They can be reported to credit agencies which can affect their ability to get a job, get
an apartment, get a car. Um, and also they are subject to collections. This is a very serious step. Their wages can be garnished. Their tax refunds can be offset. Um, there are procedures that they can take to rehabilitate their loans and come out of default, but they
do need guidance on how to do that. >> Yeah. Um, when working on your recent report regarding FSA, was GAO made aware that the department was planning to transfer full responsibility of the default portfolio and other student aid
programs to the Treasury Department? No. I'm deeply concerned about further dismantling of the department through this reckless move. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to enter into the record an article titled Treasury Department struggles to collect defaulted student
loans. Without objection, it'll be entered. >> Thank you. Uh, since early 2025, the Trump administration has been laser focused on dismantling the Department of Education, one program at a time, despite the department's continued claims that no employees working on core
functions of the FAFSA or student loan servicing were impacted by the RIFF and that the riffs will not directly impact students and families. GAO found that there has in fact been significant changes to the FSA staffing. Um, Miss
Emry RS, how have the staffing levels changed at FSA since the start of 2025? >> They dropped by 656 employees. >> And do you have any idea um what that percentage is?
>> Almost half, 46%. >> That's pretty significant. And so the claims that um student loan servicing were not impacted by the riff is clearly um inaccurate. I appreciate your time and your answers. I yield back.
>> I thank the gentle lady and I recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Harris. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and uh thank you to all of you on the panel here today and uh I've enjoyed reading your testimonies as well as hearing you this this morning. Uh, President Graasso, th
this committee found that nearly two dozen universities across the country had specialized joint research partnerships with China involving sensitive military technology. Now, I'm concerned by the lack of caution our schools have when partnering with our
greatest foreign adversaries such as the Chinese Communist Party. I guess my question for you is what harm does the take money first ask questions later approach have for our students and our national security in your opinion?
>> Uh Congressman uh I agree with you uh on concerns about sensitive military data. We do not have any policy that resembles take money first and ask questions later. We are very committed to our national security and I as a former
military officer am uh very concerned if there is any uh um risk to sharing sensitive military data and I and I can assure you we are committed to protecting our research from our advers
adversaries. Just as a followup to that, um, because we we can't, as you know, accept conflicts of interest when it comes to defense research. So, what actions would you take if you learned that a Chinese national working at the University of
Michigan as a J1 visa researcher was in fact simultaneously working at a PRC university or company that engaged in defense work related to China? Uh uh Congressman, I I uh hesitate to uh to
engage in speculation. However, uh if we had an individual that was working for an institution in China and did not disclose it, we would uh terminate that individual for deliberately uh violating our policies uh of disclosure. So that's
what we would do. >> Okay. Well, thank you, sir. As you noted in your testimony right before your tenure, the University of Michigan did terminate a partnership with a Chinese university that helped improve China's development of nuclear weapons. I think that was a great move and I certainly
hope that that sort of common sense will continue to prevail. Uh, I had the privilege of introducing the No Contracts with Foreign Adversaries Act, which passed the House as part of the Deterrent Act. And this bill would begin to tackle this problem at the collegiate
level by requiring institutions to disclose contracts with China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran rather than enter into these partnerships unscrutinized. So, um, I appreciate your answers. Miss Farley, real quickly, your
testimony mentioned President Trump's 2021 National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 and Florida's simultaneous efforts to crack down on foreign influence in these public universities. Can you tell us a little bit about how
did the University of Florida implement the president's memo more specifically and how has that implementation you believe improved research security? Yes, absolutely. So, NSPM33 when it was
passed um was the first of many steps that we saw among um our federal partners to regulate and the research security space. The office of science, technology and policy um was then directed to um to uh regulate federal
agencies and reg federal agencies provide guidance to us. those clear um expectations from our federal agencies related to research security have been very helpful to us. Um anytime the federal granting agencies are able to harmonize those regulations, it provides
clear and consistent guidance to universities such as the University of Florida so that we can ensure that we are be being good stewards of the of the federal research enterprise. >> Thank you. Thank you, Miss Johnson. real quickly in about 40 seconds. Um, some
may argue that discussing the topic uh this topic could hurt international students by stereotyping people based on race or ethnicity. But on the other hand, can can you share how malign foreign foreign influences affects
international students such as Chinese students who are being targeted by their own government? Yeah, I have tal spoke to a lot of people at Stanford about uh how the Chinese Communist Party exerts control
over its own people. They have a national security law from 2017 that requires a Chinese citizen, no matter where they are in the world, to report back information if requested. Um, and their families are often threatened if they don't cooperate. Um, so these are
the kinds of threats we're looking at and it's really heartbreaking. Well, thank you so much for your courage. As my colleague mentioned earlier, we appreciate your willingness to stand. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. >> I thank the gentleman. And I recognize gentleman from Oregon or excuse me,
Washington, Mr. Bombgardner, originally from Michigan, too, right? >> Parents were from the great state of Michigan. >> That's what counts. That's the DNA. >> There we are. There we are. There we are. Well, thank you, Mr. uh chair, for holding this hearing on such an important uh subject. Uh, Mr. Graasso,
uh, who owns the University of Michigan? >> I I believe legally it's the regents that are responsible. >> And who do they work for? >> They work for the people of Michigan. >> The people of Michigan. So, it's the people of Michigan and there's quite a few taxpayer dollars from the federal government as well too.
>> Indeed. >> Yeah. So, it's a public university. What do you think is the public's expectations on transparency uh when federal funds uh come to a university like yours? Excuse not federal funds, foreign funds come to for university like yours. >> I I think that we attempt to be
transparent in all our transactions, Congressman. >> And you think the public would like that? You think the public wants to know about every dollar that goes every foreign dollar that goes to the University of Michigan? You think the public would like to know about every foreign dollar that goes to the University of Michigan? >> I I hesitate to speak for the entire public, but I presume that there is a
group uh a subgroup of the public that would be very interested in that. And is there are there any is there any foreign funding that goes to the University of Michigan that you believe should not be disclosed? >> Foreign funding. I I cannot think of uh
foreign funding unless perhaps uh we are working with perhaps a pharmaceutical company in uh in Switzerland uh as a by way of example where they are developing proprietary uh pharmaceuticals. >> Well, let's talk about foreign government funding. Is there any foreign
government funding that goes to the University of Michigan that you would think should not be disclosed? >> Uh I can't think of any uh congressman at >> Okay. So we had a bill called the deterrent act which lowers the thresholds for uh reporting on foreign
funding from a current threshold of $250,000 down to $0 for four key uh potential foreign adversaries, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. and $50,000 for for everybody else. Uh that bill is passed out of the house. Do you have any
problem with the University of Michigan just implementing uh that bill on its own? >> Uh Congressman, I personally have not looked at that bill. And I would >> But we just said that you you think every foreign government dollar that goes to your campus, the public has an interest in uh full disclosure of those
public dollars, the same public that owns your university. >> I I I appreciate that. Uh but I would like to to discuss that with my team back in Ann Arbor before I rendered an opinion on that. >> Did you use outside counsel to prepare for the hearing today? >> Uh yes, >> you did. What did you pay for the
outside counsel uh for for the you don't know? You believe in transparency in your public university uh by your taxpayers, but you don't know uh how much you paid for the outside counsel that helped you prepare today? >> Uh no, I Well, they should have prepared you for the question about what is the
threshold of foreign dollars, foreign government dollars that came uh to your university because of your public that you work for has a real interest on that subject. Uh Miss Johnson, uh when you graduated from high school, did you expect to be targeted by Chinese spies
uh on the University of Stanford campus? >> No, never. >> So, what was your first reaction when you heard that this was happening? >> I was really surprised. Um, I grew up learning a lot about China. This was something that I was never really aware of. Um, and
I was surprised that it was happening to me because at the time, you know, I was just a freshman research assistant studying China. And, uh, I was surprised that, you know, I would be someone worth targeting. >> And do you how did Stanford respond?
Were they were they did they illustrate due concern? I mean, did they respond the way that you think your parents would have wanted them to respond? >> Uh, I I was definitely disappointed by their response. Um, it was kind of
dismissive. Uh, you know, they just said, "We're looking into this," and nothing ever came of it. So, at the same time that universities are spending millions of dollars on left-wing woke DEI political nonsense, uh they have a
student being targeted uh by spies by Chinese spies on their campus and rather having an immediate appropriate response, they were hesitant. Is is that correct? >> Correct. >> Well, uh Miss Johnson, I think you're a rock star. Uh I think you have a very bright future uh in front of you. Uh, I
think you're the kind of graduate from America's high schools that every patriotic parent in America aspires to have, and I'm sure that you have uh many potential job offers in national security moving forward, but uh me and my office would certainly be interested to talk to you at some point. Thank you,
Mr. Chair. With that, I yield back. >> I I I thank the uh author of the Turn Act and thanks uh thanks for showing how you can acquire new staff members.
And now I uh am pleased to recognize the gentleman from Guam, Mr. Molen. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh Mr. Johnson, consider Guan as well. Thank you. Um our American colleges and universities, we lead the way, right? We're premier institutions. our students and because
of this students from around the world uh they compete to to come to them and our colleges and universities because we lead the way uh we we play an important role in research experimentation and innovation and we're credited with
inventing great things electronic computer military infrared night vision next radar countless medical innovations and even chicken nuggets credited to Dr. Robert Baker from Cornell University in 1963.
So, we got to be vigilant and watch out for our foreign espionage and IP theft. And it's well documented that students and faculties uh espionage does occur and our American intellectual property ends up in the hands of foreign
adversaries and Congress uh takes uh common sense action to increase transparency and safeguard our nation's security. Uh, Miss Johnson, you were the target of a suspected uh CCP agent and students
uh can um can some of our most are threatened by this by this and pressured by bad actors as you've been explaining. Uh you also call for a reporting mechanism for students um and putting in proper guils and victims but yet victims
remain silent uh they don't feel comfortable in reporting. uh what do you think uh we can do to help help that uh so they don't feel uncomfortable reporting these incidents and stilling addressing these serious security threats please.
>> I think we need to make sure that whatever reporting mechanism we use is secure and anonymous if needed. I think um a lot of students fear that maybe if they report something it will get back to them and they could get in trouble. Um, and I also think we just need to
have a lot more dialogue about transnational repression and how it's affecting students. I think right now it's sort of not discussed and I think uh if we can bring these things into the light, people will feel a lot more comfortable
talking about it. >> Uh, thank you very much uh for what you do and your courage. I appreciate you very much. M President Garson, uh, in your testimony, you mentioned that there's been a handful of incidents that occurred without the university's
knowledge and despite comprehensive security and compliance programs. How do how can the federal government better support colleges and universities to identify these threats and close awareness gaps? >> Uh, Congressman, uh, thank you. We work
closely with our federal partners and the more closely we can work with them on knowledge that they have about individuals that could pose a threat uh that would be very helpful to us. But we implement many federal requirements in terms of uh training and uh research
controls and export and research security has been and and will always be fundamental to our mission. So we want to work as closely as possible with our federal partners. >> Appreciate that. Uh doc uh Mrs. Fairley
um Miss Fairley uh in your position you got to ensure compliance every day. It's tough. Uh you also mentioned that your testimony and reporting requirements for commulative gifts of 50,000 or more for fiscal year being reported by the university. So to be clear uh not all
large gifts are risk for national security. But I also want to point out that the bad actors are good at getting around reporting requirements and can go under the radar. So, how does UF ensure that it's not missing reporting requirements if bad actors are masking
gifts? >> At at the University of Florida, our institution reviews all agreements regardless of funding level. So, not just those that reach a certain dollar threshold. We review all gifts, contracts, and other agreements at a certain funding level. And in addition
to the reporting you have mentioned um the institution is also required to report um yearly any collaborations or agreements with um entities in foreign countries of concern. So we have multiple levels of review and oversight. Just as a followup, how can Congress
support colleges and universities in identifying bad actors uh who are trying to circumvent reporting requirements and gifts and might put at a security risk? Please. >> Well, I can only speak for the
University of Florida. What I can say is that the recent um efforts that of various federal agencies to provide information and resources through such activities as the NSF secure center through the DoD's 1286 list. Those types
of resources have been very helpful to the University of Florida and identifying um different entities that of which we should be concerned. >> Thank you. Thank you to the panel, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. >> Thank the gentleman. I pleased to recognize the gentle lady from North
Carolina, chairman emeritus Fox. >> Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I I do have some questions, but I want to start out by thanking Joe Wilson again for many years ago ringing the alarm on this issue and
specifically about Confucious Institutes. I'm not sure Joe has ever gotten the credit that he deserves for that. President and I thank our witnesses for being here. President Graasso, I understand the University of Michigan had a joint institute
partnership with Shanghai Zhao Tong University for over two decades after a congressional letter from the select committee on the CCP pointing out the serious military research done by Xiao Tong. I understand this partnership was
ended in January of last year. Is that correct? Yes, Congresswoman. >> So, can you confirm they're no longer student or faculty exchanges with this university? >> Uh, Congresswoman, we do not have a formal relationship with that university. We ended it uh as you
mentioned and it was never a research partnership. It was just an educational partnership where students would study in in uh one institution or uh the other. So we uh we do have a relationships where our students can do
study abroad there just like any students from any uh universities. It's not a specific program with our university. >> So what steps has the University of Michigan taken continually to evaluate
its foreign relationships so it doesn't take a congressional letter for the university to end problematic relationships. We have uh a we have office an office for international relationships and an associate provost that works in this area and we we've
been talking with her about making sure that our relationships do not uh threaten national security. >> Thank you again. President Graasso, current law deems adversarial countries like China and Russia as countries of
concern. Current law also labels certain entities quote foreign entities of concern end quote which includes entities controlled by countries of concern terrorist organizations and entities on specific national security
list. Do you believe the University of Michigan should have close relationships with such countries and entities despite these labels in law? Uh uh, Congresswoman, are you asking specifically should we eliminate all
relationships with the countries of concern or >> I'm just asking do you think you should have those? >> I think that we evaluate all of our relationships to make sure that they do not threaten a national security.
>> Okay. Um, and are are you committing to the University of Michigan proactively refusing to accept monetary funds from such entities and countries? >> We will not accept monetary funds that put any of our national security at
risk. Congresswoman, >> thank you. Miss Farley, you talk about how the University of Florida has a policy not to enter into contracts, agreements, or activities with entities on US government watch list. How do you
think this institutional decision boosts research security? And do you think other institutions should follow suit? I can only speak for the University of Florida, but we have had a long-standing policy, as you've referenced, not to
enter into any agreement of any kind with an ent with a restricted entity. And we have found that policy to be helpful because it provides clarity to our researchers and other employees about our standards um as to who they can and cannot interact with.
Well, it sounds to me like that would be a good model for other schools to follow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. >> I thank the gentle lady and I recognize the gentleman from Missouri or is it Missouri? Mr. Ander.
>> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, and thank you, Chairman Wahberg, for holding this important oversight hearing. Uh this year we're preparing for America's 250th anniversary, but this is also the 25th anniversary of the tragic anthra anthrax
attacks in Washington DC and New York. Uh which um elevated the danger of bioweapons to national attention. Uh we've made significant strides in biodefense since those attacks. But according to recent reports, we're
facing a growing threat. Uh, China has renewed its pursuit of anthrax counter measures and has expanded its anthrax bioweapons capabilities. Uh, this is concerning because these new counter measures are almost certainly being developed to protect Chinese war
fighters and enable the offensive use of anthrax boweapons. What's particularly concerning is that the PRC companies producing these anthrax capabilities are asso affiliated uh with PRC government
uh entities including the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and State Key Laboratories a doctrinal part of the PRC's governance. One example is China Biologics Products Holding uh CBPH uh whose Anthrex affiliated subsidiary
underwent a 192 acre expansion uh through a multi-billion dollar investment to enable more countermeasure production capability and whose base performance just received PRC regulatory approval despite the danger of anthrax
biolog biological weapons and amid concerns about antitoxin shortfalls in the US strategic national stockpile. American universities have been complicit in driving investments into hedge funds that are funded and enabled these Chinese anthrax facility
expansions. One example is Hill House, a leading investor in the privatization of CPBH, whose family of funds invested over $300 million. Universities have invested their endowments into various Hill House funds. Stan uh Stanford
reportedly invested 200 million into Hill House funds. Yale reported over earning over two billion from Hillhouse funds. Princeton, MIT, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Texas system um are also Hill House investors. It's not just anthrax.
Hillhouse investments are also connected to China's Weaguer genocide. Um Dr. Greso Michigan u is also implicated here. The University of Michigan invested 1.6 billion uh across 83
investments into China. Two current Michigan faculty have co-author authored papers with faculty at state key laboratory of toxicology and medical counter measures and the academy of military sciences. Uh some of the very
same PRC institutions developing anthrax programs. And as chairman Wahberg highlighted last year, Michigan researchers have recent were recently arrested for trying to smuggle biologic materials into Michigan laboratories. Uh
can you confirm that Michigan has uh has backed off from investing in funds linked to PRC's anthrax facilities including Hill House and Centurium Capital? Uh, Congressman, uh, I am not
familiar with the specifics of the investments of our endowment. I can, uh, take that question back and look into that. But I assure you that if we had concerns that our investments were being used for this type of development, we would, uh, take appropriate measures.
I >> Is is is Michigan conducting diligence on where PRC investments are going? And uh do you believe Michigan would commit to devest of PRC linked funds? >> Uh th those decisions are made by our
board of regents uh congressman and I will uh look into whether we do have any investments in PRC uh entities. >> Okay. Very good. Um All right. Thank you very much, M. Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
>> I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman for Virginia, the ranking member, Mr. Scott. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Miss Emry Harris, um you asked answered a question a little earlier failed to answer because I understand that's because you
hadn't researched the question and you would give um an answer. If it was a question that you had been asked by Congress to research, you could give the answer. Is that right? >> That is correct. Now, we've asked you to look at the dismantling of the
Department of Education. Have you experienced access issues and delays in working with the Department of Education? >> We have, sir. I can provide specifics. Um, on the study that we had looking at the reductions in the Office of Federal
Student Aid, we faced significant delays in obtaining just basic data. For example, we wanted data on the number of reductions in staff, right? It's a job about looking at those staff reductions. We wanted to know the number of staff that had been reduced over the course of
the year. Um, and we asked for that information at various points. It took us eight months, sir, to receive that basic data. Eight months to find out how many staff had um been reduced at the Office of Federal Student Aid. In
addition, we face significant delays in scheduling critical meetings. >> Thank you. Now, we've heard about the transfer of defaulted student loans from education to um treasury. You already mentioned the fact that the overseeing
the service is already a problem. They'll obviously be exacerbated if you go over to Treasury. But let me just ask you a question. And is it possible that some students in default may actually be entitled to a total discharge of the
loan? >> We could look into that and circle back with you, sir. >> I mean, if if if if somebody's been teaching for 12 years and just didn't know about the public service loan forgiveness program, uh they would be entitled to a discharge and people in
education might know that, but do you think the people in Treasury would know? Um, I wouldn't be able to comment on that, sir. Thank you. >> Okay. Um, what did you say about the Miss Miss Aris? What did you say about the number of racial discriminations cases brought
by the um office of civil rights >> during the the time period that we looked at from March through uh September of 25? Um the office received more than 9,000 complaints of alleged
discrimination. Um and they opened additional cases. Um, however, they resolved 7,000 complaints and 90% of those resolutions were dismissals. >> How many of those were racial discrimination? Do you know? >> Um, we don't know.
>> Okay. Uh, President Graaso um you mentioned the value of um an internationally diverse um research body. What happens if you can't recruit the best and the brightest from across the world? What happens to your
competitiveness? >> Uh, Congressman, uh, if we are limited in our ability to recruit the best and the brightest, uh, the our potential will be diminished. >> Um, we've heard a lot about the sensitivity of some of the research. Do
your students get security clearances? uh our students uh would only get security clearances if it was required to do work uh for their research >> on a specific project >> on a specific project. >> Um and so if there's no national defense
classification or particular intellectual property rights students talk about what they do during the day. Uh why why would they be prohibited from talking about some of the research that they're they're doing? uh congressman even if it's not uh restricted in ter in
terms of national security defense there could be commercial uh reasons that we would ask our students to maintain confidentiality >> that would be on a case-by case basis they would know on that and so is the research that is in fact sensitive
conducted under different conditions than other research >> uh it it would be a case- by case basis congressman Um, Miss M. Johnson, you indicated a um harassment and bullying by the foreign
um foreign sources, foreign agent, and the university did not have a process to respond. Is that right? >> Yes, that's correct. Uh shouldn't the university have a process to respond for that kind of victimiza victimization
regardless of the source of the um vict of the problem? When I was told by the FBI that I'm being transnationally repressed, the FBI told me that they also contacted campus authorities and administration and no
one contacted me. But the with whatever the source, they should have just I don't think there's anything special about the international intrigue about the thing. If you've been victimized like that, they should have had a response.
Period. >> The gentleman yields. Seeing no other members wishing to be recognized, I would now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Scott from Virginia for his closing statement. >> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
um I think this we've on this side pointed out a lot of problems in higher education. We've had many hearings on this apparently one problem. Uh we've passed legislation last year to deal with it.
Uh people have gone to jail. So not sure the anything wrong with the system as it is, but there are serious problems particularly in the student loan area where the um student loan and the impact of the big ugly bill where there are
limitations on the ability particularly going to medical school um that need to be dealt with and we're not dealing with them. We've um moving student loans to Treasury will just make things worse. We haven't had any uh
hearings on that and I would hope we'd focus on things that the students were actually dealing with um uh rather than continually having hearings on the same subject meeting after meeting. You back.
I thank the gentlemen and uh I certainly recognize the sincerity of of your concerns. Uh I would address the fact that today I thank you uh to the to the panel for being here. Uh this at the very least I
would hope could be seen by my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as a hearing looking at outcomes of what we have sincerely attempted to do in dealing with a significant security
research taxpayer dollar usage funding problem international problem that we took we took significant action on with the deterrent act.
I I think it's always good to evaluate and I look forward to evaluating the impact of the IAAS all of them including the exciting impact of what we've done with FAFSA making it work finally after
years of not working and not even being being in place to work. Uh I think I think the uh minority should expect that they will have an opportunity as always to question right up to including the secretary of
education and I'm looking forward to that myself. Um today was I think an example that we have educational entities that have had challenges in the past that we were
concerned with and now today we see that they've taken significant action. Nothing will be perfect. The other side the enemy I think we could call it just has to be right once.
University of Michigan champions and the best have to be right every time. And uh we applaud the efforts of of Florida. We we applaud the efforts there. And I think it was good to see institutions that
are using the means necessary to deal with a significant and sincere problem. Thank you. Stanford, I hope, was watching and listening to what was said today by a student, a journalist,
um, committed to getting information and getting it out and the negative impact that she and others like her most likely have on that campus. And that shouldn't be the case. We would hope that Stanford would see that there's a reason to respond
aggressively at the very least to make sure that alumni of the institution goes away with the desire to send others in the future back to that institution. I would think that would be something that we'd we'd want to see with students
that that go to our campuses. So I think uh today was certainly a good evaluative hearing not simply saying we did it with the with the deterrent act. We had a couple of hearings on it leading up to
deterrent act and now ques and as my colleague said pixie dust I can't even I can't even remember all that he said there. So anyway, that's that's what it was. And so I thank you for this information. And I hope there
are other institutions all around this country that see we're serious about that and that they don't want to be brought up in front of this panel to be shown as missing the mark in doing what's appropriate, being
worldclass institutions, doing the research that's necessary to keep us moving forward. using a diverse population of people with the intellect, the desires, and the passions necessary to find, but always for the best benefit of the United States. I don't think
that's wrong. I hesitate to move to the alternate hearing that we had today because it was an alternate hearing. But, um, we've dealt with that. We've dealt with a higher cost of education by trying to put a downward
pressure on the high cost of education through the one big beautiful bill, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act. We put caps in place. We also did something to counteract what
was done to exacerbate the problem of student loan debt by the past administration that basically said if you wait out long enough you won't have to pay it back. Oh, the taxpayer will. That's not satisfactory for me.
And the majority didn't think it was satisfactory as well. We'll evaluate that too. We also put in means by which these individuals who are out of compliance can get back into compliance. Will it take some effort? Oh, you bet it
will. Paying my mortgage off took took some effort. Paying any car loans that I had off that I had in the past took some effort and commitment. And I think that's what we have done with our proposal. Will it work?
Mr. Scott, you and I will have the opportunity to ask some of those questions. And I think you're right to ask for it, and I'm right to want to have that when we have the opportunity. But today, I appreciate the the discussion we had. I appreciate the answers that were given, the sincerity,
and even some that couldn't be given, promise to get the information further. I'd like to thank our witnesses again. Uh, and without objection, there there being no further business, the committee stands adjourned.