a total of um what is it? $441 million to Yale University. Now, no one thinks that Gernzie is a enemy of the United States or an adversary, but it is bizarre that a nation with 67,000 people
is able to give half a billion dollars a year to one of America's elite universities. Where is the money really coming from? What is it being spent on? As with Qatar, for the most part, we don't know. We have some idea where the
Qatar money has gone to. It has built a medical school in Doha. Um, it has also given money to MIT, to Harvard, Rutgers, Stanford, UCLA, University of Chicago, University of Maine, Carnegi, Melon,
Georgetown, and about 25 other American colleges and universities. Why? What is Qatar getting for this? We really don't know and that's a question worth asking. So what this committee has ahead of it is the issue of what is the problem at
hand and what are the solutions. The problem at hand most obviously is that American technology and expertise has flooded across the Pacific Ocean to China. Um, in 2014, a member of my
organization called me up and said, "My college president is bringing the Confucious Institute to my campus. What is that? Do you know?" My answer was, "I didn't know, but I would find out." It took me about two years, many freedom of information requests, dozens of visits
to college campuses, but eventually we got the idea that China had launched a agent of influence operation run by the Hanban, the propaganda agency, the Chinese Communist Party that had bribed its way into American colleges and
universities. that offered colleges not only free teachers and free textbooks but an actual payment to host a confucious institute. Um when we started calling this out, China lined up college presidents from around the country saying this is a wholesome exchange of
ideas. We are engaged in cultural exchange here and nothing worse than that. But after we kept pouring on the data what was really going on, China pulled the plug on the Confucious Institutes, now there aren't any under that name. Although I continue to
believe that they are around by the dozens. They've just been rebranded the way DEI has been rebranded, moved to a different office, given a different head. China's influence through Confucious Institutes under another name remains. How much is China spending to
buy influence in American higher education? Well, it's getting a lot for whatever it is. It gets access to America's best intellectual talent. It manages to trick a lot of these people into cooperative arrangements with Chinese counterparts and American ideas
and technology just pours out of the country and there is very little that the country has done to stop this. Um, so there's a money problem here, but there's also an influence problem. What do Americans actually know about China?
Well, if they are engaged in uh universities with Confucious institutes or their successors, they're not learning anything about the South China Sea, Tibet, the Weaguers, uh the uh organ harvesting, the vast number of
mischievous things, let's call them, that China engages in and that the American public knows very little about. Um, the vulnerabilities of American higher education are built into their strengths. The great strength of American higher education, we're told,
is its openness. Its openness has been seized by our adversaries and exploited beautifully well to take advantage of what we are unable to bolt down as we should. Thank you.
>> Thank you. Um, next is Mr. Craig Singleton. Uh he is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. He has spent two decades of experience in national
security and US China relations including serving as a US diplomat. He received his bachelor's degree from the University of Florida, his master's degree of te from Texas&M Texas&M University. I'll forgive you for being uh from two SEC rivals of LSU. Um but we
look forward to hearing from you today, sir. >> Chairman Cassidy, ranking members, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding foreign influence and American higher education. I'm pleased to offer policy insights from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a
nonpartisan research institute where I serve as a senior fellow. America's higher education system remains one of our country's greatest strategic assets. US universities anchor the world's most dynamic research environment. They produce breakthroughs in science,
medicine, engineering, and technology that drive economic growth, strengthen national security, and reinforce the United States's global leadership and innovation. The openness, collaboration, and intellectual exchange that define American academia are enduring
strengths. At the same time, those strengths have made American universities attractive targets for exploitation by foreign adversaries, especially China. Beijing and other authoritarian regimes understand that US universities sit at the center of
America's innovation base, talent pipeline, and advanced research ecosystem. They have sought to take advantage of that access for a range of purposes. acquiring sensitive knowledge and technology, shaping research partnerships, cultivating influence,
monitoring students and dissident, and advancing broader strategic objectives that run counter to US national security interests. Addressing these challenges requires balance, but it also requires clarity. Not every foreign relationship is problematic. The United States
benefits enormously from international academic collaboration, but partnerships, funding arrangements, and opaque institutional ties involving foreign countries of concern or entities linked to them warrant far greater scrutiny than they have historically
received. The question is not whether American universities should remain globally engaged. They should. The question is whether the United States has adequate safeguards in place to ensure that openness is not exploited by malign actors. For many years, one of the biggest obstacles to answering that
question was a lack of transparency. Policymakers, regulators, and in many cases, universities themselves lacked the tools to fully understand the scale, origin, and strategic implications of foreign funding and foreign linked partnerships.
Reporting requirements were incomplete. Enforcement was uneven and public visibility was limited. Encouragingly, that picture is beginning to change. The Department of Education's new foreign funding portal represents an important step forward. Better data alone won't
solve the problem, but better data make it harder to ignore. Early disclosures help illustrate the scale of foreign engagement. According to federal reporting data, China alone has contributed $6.8 8 billion in gifts and contracts to American universities over
time. Even more concerning, the Department of Education's portal shows that universities reported roughly $400 million in transactions involving entities that appear on US government watch lists or restricted entity lists. These include
firms tied to export control violations, national security concerns, and China's military civil fusion program. These figures do not necessarily imply wrongdoing by universities, but they do highlight a broader structural challenge. Universities are often
expected to navigate complex national security risks without consistent federal guidance or standardized due diligence tools. Congress now has an opportunity to modernize transparency and oversight in ways that protect both national security and academic openness.
In my written testimony, I outlined several practical steps. First, Congress should strengthen transparency requirements governing foreign gifts and contracts under section 117 of the Higher Education Act. Second, policymakers should permanently institutionalize and support the
Department of Education's foreign funding transparency portal. Third, universities would benefit from clearer federal guidance and better information sharing to help them evaluate foreign partnerships and research collaborations. Fourth, institutions
that receive federal research funding should meet much stronger research security and transparency standards. And finally, policymakers may wish to consider targeted visa screening tied to institutional affiliations with entities or individuals involved in military
civil fusion or that appear on relevant US government watch lists. Taken together, these steps would modernize oversight of foreign engagement in American higher education while preserving the openness that makes our universities the best in the world. On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, I thank you again for inviting me to testify today. >> Thank you, sir. And now, Senator Kim will introduce Mr. Daly. >> Thank you, Chairman. We'll turn to our final witness here, uh, Robert Daly. Mr. Daly is a senior fellow for the Asia
Society. He served as the former director at the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Wilson Center from 2013 to 2025. He began his work in US China relations at the American Embassy in Beijing in the
late 80s. He is a director of the National Committee on US China relations and the American Mandarin Society. A member of the task force on US China policy and leads numerous international dialogues and research projects. and he lived in China for 12 years and has
interpreted for Chinese and American leaders including Jimmy Carter and Henry Kissinger. I yield back. >> Well, good morning, Chairman Cassidy. Uh, and thank you very much, Senator Kim. Uh, thank you to all of the members of the committee for the opportunity to
testify today. Uh we are here to assess the state of malign foreign influence in American higher education and to ask how academia and government can continue to enhance their cooperation to protect research integrity and promote national
security. Uh we are concerned about many countries that have been now formerly designated as countries of concern. I am going to focus on China which is my area of expertise. As detailed in my written testimony, I have spent years working with universities and government agencies to make sure they understand
each other's concerns about academic interaction with China and to try to ensure that they also appreciate the benefits of continuing certain types of interaction with China. Government and academia must work in tandem because
American suspicion about foreign malign influence on our campuses and especially Chinese influence is both reasonable and necessary to protect our national security and academic integrity for the reasons that uh my fellow witnesses have already laid out. Everything that we
know about the motives and the methods of the Chinese Communist Party indicates that they will try to exploit the vulnerabilities created by openness and internationalization of our colleges and universities. Furthermore, this USChina rivalry, a comprehensive rivalry, is
likely going to last for decades. So, we don't have a quick fix. Uh these threats will continue and we are going to need constant vigilance and we're going to need to constantly adapt. American security agencies began working closely with higher educational
institutions to reduce these risks about a decade ago. We we we've been at it for a while. This cooperation was sometimes difficult uh but it was necessary. And the good news I think for all of us is that this cooperation is also working.
American universities have taken on Washington's concerns and they now work diligently and at a considerable expense to anticipate and counter the actions of countries of concern. Uh, American security agencies and the
Congress as well and higher educational institutes have now developed common concerns, a common vocabulary for talking about them and habits of cooperation. And so I want to emphasize today that this has been a success story. vigilance, yes, but it is not a cause for panic. Certainly not a cause
for a renewed wave of accusations. If we had in the portal for public reporting, a time series that showed not only, as we just saw, the cumulative donations made to American universities, some of which go back to
the 80s. But if we were able to see the donations from each country over each year, I suspect we would find uh that since we started working together on this, those donations have been down. This I think is one of the biggest silences of the portal. Uh there's there's no time series there. It's all
cumulative. It is also worth noting to date that there have been no convictions of university persons for conducting espionage on American campuses on behalf of China. There have been cases of program fraud, failures uh of
disclosure, lying under oath, tax evasion, and some baffling levels of bad judgment and bad practice. Uh all of which are extremely concerning and are indicative of genuine problems. But we haven't yet seen an espionage case. And this lack of convictions indicates to me
that the problem has either been slightly overstated despite our reasonable suspicions or that perhaps we are actually managing it increasingly well. In the next phase of cooperation going forward as academia academia and government work together,
we have to move beyond our reasonable suspicions and formulate policies based on data. That is the only way to get an accurate picture of the threat. What has been missing from the influence debate from the beginning is an effort to weigh demonstrable harms, not the
suspicions, but the demonstrable harms done to American security through foreign influence on campus against the many gains we have reaped by attracting foreign talent over the past 40 years. That measure isn't there. We need a
costbenefit analysis based on evidence to guide us going forward. Last, our ultimate concern is for American security visa v China, especially in the technology domain. And therefore, our emphasis needs to be not on the already
vigilant universities, but on rebuilding our own scientific and industrial might. We mustn't abandon defensive measures. We should enhance them. But we need to move from defense to offense to build up our own technology and industrial systems. I think that is the American
style. We're better on offense. Thank you. >> Thank you, sir. Um I I will defer to Senator Marshall. >> Well, well, thank you, Chairman, and again, welcome to our our witnesses. Uh today, I probably will focus a little
bit more on the importance of intellectual property theft. I think that's my my biggest concern. um already through NIH and all of our federal research is made public that the whole world benefits from that and as we
allow foreign students into our research specifically let's talk about China for a second even if they don't walk out with papers they're walking out with a lot of information in their brains and I think a lot of the information was what didn't work you can't always reproduce the all the research but you can say well we
know this didn't work this didn't work and this didn't work and we're working on you know plan D here. So Mr. Singleton is in your mind is there any foolproof way of keeping uh China from stealing our intellectual property no matter how many u policies we create?
>> Sure. Thank you, Senator. Um I think it was a 2019 Senate investigation revealed that Chinese intellectual property theft on campus uh robbed us of 200 to600 billion a year in intellectual property theft. So I think it's already been quantified. the concern and I think the
House Permanent Select or the House Select Committee on Countering the CCP released a report this year showing that even today there are thousands of jointly published research reports between US academics and Chinese academics from institutions affiliated
with China's military. That's happening today. >> I think you're right to point out the the restrictions and the need for restrictions frankly on these sorts of partnerships. We have to ask ourselves whether DoD research funding should be allowed uh to flow to US universities
that maintain partnerships with Chinese researchers and entities that are supporting Chinese military civil fusion. As of today, there are no restrictions on those funding streams whatsoever. And that seems like one area where we can protect our most vital and sensitive intellectual property. >> Yeah, thank you. I want to probably turn
to um foreign giving to American universities uh by country. And let me say I agree with Senator Cassidy that it's a a good thing to have American universities in the Middle East. And of course they're not just the Middle East, they're all over over the world. I think it's a great way to um build
relationships as well. I think it's important to to point out that when we we have our list of of who's giving what, Qatar's funding, 90% of that is going to fund six universities in Qar, six United States
universities in Qar. It's not a gift to those universities. 90% of that funding is for the six universities in Qatar. And we should be complimenting what they're doing. They're trying to build a knowledgebased economy. Think about this. I mean I my only criticism of is that they chose Texas A&M for
engineering over Kansas State University for engineering. But but boy these are the who's who and it is costly. Cornell for for um medicine and I think Sony mentioned that's the largest. It is very expensive to have premed and medical programs uh as as well Virginia
Commonwealth for the school of arts&M for engineering. I mentioned Carnegie Melon uh for computer science and AI. Georgetown for international affairs. Northwestern for journalism. all universities with with great uh histories a as well. Um so again I think
it is important to track the money and track the influence but I think it's a great way uh and and by the way I I hope these universities are making a little money on them and maybe it helps fund uh some undergraduate scholarships as well. So I think I'll just leave it leave it
there Mr. chairman and appreciate um you bringing the attention to to this as well and and look forward to I believe Senator Tillis has a bill that maybe we're considering that's that's has some good work to do as well. Thank you. >> Thank you, Dr. Marshall. Uh Senator Murray,
>> thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing on higher education a really critical topic for a lot of us. I have to say in the context of what is happening globally right now, I just find it kind of absurd that Trump and Republicans are willing to burn billions
of dollars a day on a new war that no one asked for. But I have to say, when it comes to public schools, I've been having to fight tooth and nail, as many people have, to get this Trump administration to release billions of dollars that Congress appropriated um to
be delivered to our students. and it's not happening and states like mine are having to routinely file lawsuits and this comes from an administration that routinely claims to returning education to the states. So I have a problem with that and I have a problem with the fact
that this president is sending off our promising young men and women and our incredibly important resources. When uh it comes to sending folks to college though we have to fight to protect even Pell Grants. Uh so it just seems that Trump has started
this war in the Middle East with no plan or objective. Meanwhile, he is hitting the ground running on demolishing the Department of Education. And parents I talk to every day uh don't want this president sending us our kids to a war that has no end. They don't want him
wasting billions of their dollars on missiles and misadventures. What they do want is to make sure that their kids can get access to a good education. So, if you want to put America first, that really starts by putting our kids first. And I think we are seriously off track.
And I just needed to say that. And finally, Mr. Chairman, I have to say I'm pretty troubled that we're having this hearing today to add even more responsibilities to the Department of Education when we still in this committee have not had uh Secretary
McMahon before us to answer some really serious questions about what she is doing right now, which is an illegal scheme to uh dismantle the Department of Education. Uh despite Congress, all of us saying on a bipartisan bill in in our
appropriations bill, the department does not have the authority to do this. McMahon is marching full steam ahead to dismantle the Department of Education. Uh she said she has a group uh proof of concept, but has given no proof um about
improved efficiency since she's begun to do this. And in fact, uh, what we know is the first dismantling agreement for CTA is costing costing taxpayers 1 million extra dollars. So I hope we get Secretary McMahon in front of our
committee soon because I think this is something we all deeply care about. Having said that, on the topic before us today, which I worked with both Senator Alexander and Bur on, Mr. Dr. Dailyaly, let me uh ask you. Section 117
already requires colleges and universities to disclose significant foreign gifts and contracts to the Department of Education and institutions have spent years building compliance systems around that process. However, the administration announced an inter
agency agreement shifting aspects of section 117 oversight to the department of state um as part of its broader effort that I just referenced to dismantle the department of education which has really raised concerns about confusion for institutions who are
trying to comply with the law. So, I wanted to ask you, how would moving section 117 oversight away from the Department of Education make compliance more complicated for our colleges and universities? >> Thank you, Senator.
>> Thank you, Senator. As you've already mentioned, the I think the answer to that question, it's it's a moving target because we don't know what is happening at the Department of Education and what is going to remain there. uh when section 117 was first passed as part of the higher education act in 1986 it was
the judgment of congress that this function belonged within the department of education and it is congress's uh prerogative to move it uh moving it to state uh I do see one small advantage of that which is at state department there is Aryan knowledge knowledge of China
knowledge of cutter for example such that the people at state would be able to break down the meaning the differences between different kinds of giving from the different countries. Not all giving from China is of the same sort. Most of it is not. These aren't transfers from the
Chinese Communist Party. Some of this is NOS's. Some of it is corporations. Much of it is from individuals. Yes. All of whom are ultimately subject to the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party, but they have multiple different motives. So area knowledge, whether it is at education or at the Department of
State, I think is going to be important going forward. And I think that those distinctions need to be reflected within the portal so that not only do we need to see how giving from each country is moving over time, we need to be able to distinguish different kinds of giving.
Some of which is from very very wealthy Chinese individuals who frankly want to show off to their friends that they've donated to American universities and some of which is genuinely worrisome in the ways that have been outlined and nefarious. >> Well, I think Mr. Mr Chairman, again we need the secretary in front of us so we can ask these very serious questions
that are occurring at the department. >> We have requested for the secretary to come before us to tell you that >> and the answer is >> uh this is in process >> process. >> So Senator Tupperville. >> Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good morning gentlemen. Thanks for being here. It's
no secret that foreign adversaries are involved in our higher education system. Whether it's funneling million millions of dollars in endowments or foreign governments linked to academic programs, it's everywhere in our country. You know, last few years we closed down just in my state alone several confucious
institutes. They don't deserve to be in anywhere in our country. The more I learned about the sheer numbers and influence that foreign adversaries have in our education system. It led me to introduce the Student Visa Integrity Act. I introduced it last summer after watching all these anti-American
protests on our college campuses. My bill gives the opportunity to get a degree back to Americans who love this country and not students who are adversarial uh from some of these other countries. Uh Dr. Wood, you mentioned Confucious
Institutes. Now that we've closed across this country and especially in my state some of these down, how can we tell that they're gone for sure? And then how can we tell that the affiliated professors are not still around and they're they're also not gone?
>> It won't be easy. You will have to rely on the uh truthfulness of college presidents who are known to proaricate on these matters. Uh I think auditing the institutions is probably the only sure way of finding out whether uh
Chinese funding continues to flow to these uh influence operations. >> Do you think the professors are still hanging around? >> Uh >> and how's the best way to get rid of them? >> The Hanban or the Chinese Communist Party rotates the professors in and out.
So it's not that the same people will be there. In some cases, they are, but in other cases, new ones are coming in and going out all the time. >> Thank you, Mr. Singleton. I'm glad you recognize the nation's higher education system is one of our biggest assets, uh,
if we use it right way. Obviously, our economy and our workforce is only as good as our education system. You know, I hear from students all across our state all the time about barriers that they u face uh whether it's getting into a class because we have too many foreign
students in those classes already full or the language barrier which is absolutely ridiculous when professors can't even speak our in our our language and we're trying to teach American kids. It's absolutely ridiculous. Uh so over
time if students on foreign visas outnumber American students what does that mean for our work force pipeline in the future? >> Thank you Senator. It's certainly a concerning trend that we've seen. Not only are there a large number of Chinese
students at some of these universities, but in some cases the US government itself pays Chinese postdoal students to do research at our university. And some of those students have been determined to be affiliated with not only the People's Liberation Army, but entities
in China that are affiliated with China's military-industrial complex. The long-term development challenges are massive. Of course, both Democrats and Republicans understand that we need to build our defense innovation base. We need to be investing in ourselves and preparing for this uh to control the
drivers of the 21st century industrial revolution, which are primarily technology related. We have to find an appropriate balance here. But I think we should all agree that Defense Department funding shouldn't be going to Chinese researchers who are affiliated with entities that make bombs to kill
Americans. That seems like a common sense approach and perhaps one uh for legislation could be introduced that would address that challenge. >> Thank you, Mr. Daly. How dangerous is it to our national security is to share research and technology
uh with the Chinese Communist Party? Uh well Craig is right that the evidence to date is that the most problematic group of uh Chinese scholars on American campuses is not the undergraduates or even the graduate students. It's postd
doctoral fellows and researchers. But we also have to be very careful not to tar them all with the same brush. There's definitely a problem and many of these people are also among the finest minds in their disciplines and most of them seek if they can uh to stay. The data to
date is that 85 to 90% of Chinese PhD students stay in the United States after graduating. And it's that's going down a little bit right now. We can we can talk about that as well. There's been a little bit of a reverse brain drain of people going back. Uh but that most uh seek to stay in the United States. David
Zwig, an American scholar in Hong Kong, has also demonstrated repeatedly that the people who stay here, become American citizens, and dedicate their talents to us are among the top scholars in their fields. And I think that we need to be very careful to keep that
channel open. As I write in my testimony, uh, you know, since 1901, 34% of all US Nobel prizes have been won by people who are foreign born. We do need this talent. We must also foster our own domestic talent to be absolutely sure.
But the record of these people here uh has been superb and they've dedicate, you know, themselves to science and to our research enterprise. So vigilance, staying on top of it. I am very happy to associate myself, you know, with almost all of Craig's comments. Uh, but we've got some of the biggest talent pools in
the world currently outside their borders and they would like to come in as Americans and I think we need to remain open to that despite the real threats and issues that you raised. >> Do you do you agree that they should be a fluent in English? >> They should have English language competence, especially if they're
teaching. There's a distinction. I' I've been in some of those classrooms that you're talking about. So, so yes, if they're going to be teaching, clearly they should uh be fluent in English. >> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. >> Senator Kim, >> you know, thank you, Chairman. I actually want to just pick off where Mr.
Dailyaly left off, you know, just talking about the importance of innovation as well as drawing in talent. You know, Mr. Daly said in his testimony, to achieve innovation, we must continue to attract top foreign talent to our academically free and open institutions. Dr. Wood, do you agree
with that statement? Yes, I agree. >> Sorry, you just got to turn on the microphone here. >> Sorry. Yes, I agree that we do need to continue to attract top foreign talent. Whether that top foreign talent can come from countries that are locked into an
adversarial relation with the United States seems to me to be an open question and worth further examination. >> That's an interesting point you just raised because I wanted to ask you, Dr. would uh given the concerns that you raised, widespread concerns that you raised, do you think we should as a
country go as far as to consider fully cutting off academic or research ties with Chinese institutions and researchers? >> Yes, I think we should consider it. >> Okay. Uh Mr. Singleton, do you agree with that statement? >> Not all Chinese universities directly
support China's military civil fusion strategy. Just several dozen of several thousand. So, you're zooming in on some of the national security threats. Yeah. And look, I think every single person on this committee would have concerns about national security threats and whatnot, but you know, what is before us in the
Senate is a proposal that is about every single subject matter. And and I guess I just want to ask you, Mr. Singleton, does that make sense? Do you think that there needs to be uh this deep level of oversight over every single subject matter, not just on national security? I'm not familiar with that piece of
legislation, but I don't think you have to throw the baby out with the bathwater. But I do think much more stringent restrictions need to be enacted here. >> Uh, you know, I I I think that the point that you raised, Mr. Daily, you said that there was a lack of conviction uh there was a lack of any legal
convictions about es espionage. Can you say that one more time? uh that there are clearly we have an issue on campus but to date and not for want of trying we haven't yet had a conviction for espionage by persons on
campuses acting on behalf of China we have program fraud people who aren't reporting working for Chinese talent programs people who have been double dipping actually in violation of existing un rules at their home American university there have been issues of this kind most of which occurred because
again as I say in my testimony We moved rather suddenly and correctly in my view from an attitude of engagement toward China toward realizing that we were in a very broad competition and universities and a lot of scholars who were here who had been acting under the engagement
paradigm had the ground move under them. It took some time to adjust to a more rivalous paradigm which they did with the help of many people on this committee >> and now we're in a different place. I think the universities have adjusted well >> and I think that that vigilance is important and we certainly know that there are problems that that need to be
addressed here but the question is how far do we go and and I do have concerns do Dr. What I do have concerns about what you said that we should even consider going as far as to fully cut off uh research and academic uh relations with different countries
especially competitors and adversaries because look we can have the intentions that we want here of of saying you know this is focused in on this way but we have to take into account the broader picture and and not look at this in a vacuum. So for instance Dr. would I wanted to ask you did you support the
China Initiative effort by the Department of Justice from 2018 to 2020 to that investigated researchers here in the United States? >> Yes, I did. >> Yeah. Look, I I just want to raise my deep concern about that as did many in the Asian-American community and more
broadly. You know, this is an issue that I think we have to be considering here, Mr. chairman as we're looking at this legislation to just again I get our intentions and how focused it is but the the knock-on effects here on a number of different fronts you know first of all you know I'll give you this is a
slightly different example but it has a similar type of of vein you know I worked at the state department you know I was uh had top secret security clearance worked for the US government I was banned from working on issues related to Korea because I was Korean-American I was not allowed to work on anything related to the Korean
peninsula that was deeply offensive to me as somebody who serves this country, but the suspicion because of my ethnicity. That is something that we're seeing through the, you know, that we saw firsthand through the China Initiative, through other efforts that
are putting this presumption of concern upon people of Asian descent, people of descent of other countries that we were raising suspicion about. And I just wanted to raise that because the Asian-American community has raised significant concerns about this. The
second thing is the deep chilling effect that these types of efforts could have on our foreign students coming in. My father came to the United States as a foreign student. I'll be honest with you, with the cuts to uh visas right now and the shutting off of interviews, I don't think my dad would have been able
to get a visa right now to come and study in the United States. And it's having a deep impact on colleges and universities who are dependent on so much of foreign students to come in and provide funding to their schools to be able to be continue to be R1 institutions or others. So, I I just
want us to be knowledgeable about these broader knock-on effects that could cascade and very much affect not just the health of our universities and our research partnerships uh but also our communities here and the signal that it
sends to our the diversity uh of different communities in America. And with that, I'll yield back. >> Senator Hustad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, I didn't plan to start here, but when I read and heard this discussion about to date there have no convictions
of university persons for conducting conducting espionage on American campuses, I just did a simple search on my AI and then looked at multiple other sources to back them up. Chinese student plead guilty uh for violating the US
Espionage Act for taking photos of uh using a drone to take photos of military bases. So, I I'm not suggesting that it's a rampant problem, but it does exist. And and Mr. Dailyaly, I I just encourage you to spend the time that I
just did to look and you'll see it's not just there. It's Illinois State, Ohio State, Colombia, other places have had issues with this. Again, not saying it's rampid, but to say that it doesn't exist is also not accurate. Um,
I want to I want to just uh dig in here a little bit. uh on the mutual benefit side because I don't disagree. Look, America is a place where we want to have the best talent in the world. We want to welcome it and and that's fantastic. But
uh I I did a little research on the number of Chinese students that come to America to study versus the number of American students that go to China to study. And the best data that I could find is that presently in the 2425 academic year, there are around 265,000
Chinese students studying in America and less than 10,000 American students studying in China. I get there's a population difference between the two nations and that can contribute to the to the numbers, but that doesn't seem like there's much mutual benefit. And um
and I saw you uh uh Mr. daily acknowledge that. So I I'll ask you that question. What what is this really benefiting American when you have this desperate difference? >> I think that it's benefiting America both in the pitiably low number of
Americans who go to China and in most of the American the Chinese students who come to the United States. But you're absolutely right that it's nothing like reciprocal. In fact, we're talking about two different very different things. Chinese students come to America because they know we have the best higher education system in the world and they
want to get that education. Most of the Americans and I suspect the number you gave is still high uh are going to China for language study or for short-term cultural tourism. They're not seeking degrees from Chinese universities because yeah American degrees.
>> I want I want to give the others I want to give the others uh a chance to address this. Mr. Singleton thought on that? I think we can all agree that not all Chinese students are spies. Unfortunately, all Chinese nationals are subject to China's national security laws, which mandate that all Chinese
nationals cooperate whether they like it or not with Chinese intelligence services, which is increasingly a concern. I think the drop, one of the reasons that we've seen a drop in Chinese and US students going to China is it's increasingly unsafe. The US government both during the Biden administration and the Trump
administration has outlined this the concerns the physical security concerns and the surveillance concerns to US citizens studying in China. And increasingly there's no amount of reciprocity between the two. The Chinese tightly control which American students can study at Chinese universities uh and
joint partnerships in China. And so I think those are some of the the realities that the Chinese Communist Party doesn't want American students to go to China. I'm I'm going to I'm going to share some data. This is something I found stunning. It was a precoid number, so the number is not the same. One
university that I talked with had more Chinese nationals on their campus studying than they did black students. Uh and we seem to be and why they gave me the answer is because they pay full tuition. They get they get the they get there's a financial benefit because the
money is driving the reason that many of these students are coming to the campuses. It's not a benefit to the United States. It's a financial benefit to the institution. It's why the Confucious Institutes existed. Thankfully, we got rid of them all in Ohio institutions. But isn't this really
just about um the money? >> Well, a lot of these students, their tuition is paid for by the Chinese party state. These are state directed initiatives, particularly in STEM fields to have Chinese students and researchers come to the United States to study. We
don't have any controls or due diligence on any of those researchers today. And so that seems to be a core >> imperative in they're leaving here is they're leaving here with the best the majors. You see the majors in their engineering technology. They're leaving
and then they're going back and and they're helping the Chinese government as they're required to as you said, >> right? >> Uh to compete against America. >> And I'm trying to figure out how this is benefiting America. Well, I get we want to have people here from other countries
that ultimately come to America, but it doesn't seem like the China relationship is all that beneficial to us. >> We need to enhance our visa screening and processing for so many of these students because the ones that are here because they're part of state directed programs, those requirements for the
free tuition paid for by the Chinese government is that they go back to China and then work on this research there. Right there, there's a cause and effect there and that's worthy of additional scrutiny for sure. I'm I'm out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. >> By the way, I'm watching body language
and I see oftentimes agreement among the three of you on something said, occasional disagreement, but I am struck that there is uh so just to say, Senator Kaine, >> thanks to the panel, thanks to the chair for holding this important hearing. When
I was born in 1958, um, one out of a hundred Virginiaians had been born in another country and we were bottom quarter per capita income. And today, one out of eight Virginiaians was born in another country and were top quarter per capita income. And the last time I checked, only one other state had moved
in that time from bottom quarter to top quarter. And it was North Dakota. And they discovered oil. We didn't discover anything except if you try to attack attract talent, talent will grow and the institutions and companies that want to be around talent will come. And so I
think this is a discussion, Mr. Chair, where there's a lot of agreement, but it's about trying to find that balance. H how do we not shut off our traditional role as this talent magnet by having policies toward international students
or research researchers that are too punitive? And I and I worry that we're striking the balance the wrong way. Um, in academic year 2023 24, international students contributed about 44 billion dollars to the American economy. And the
point is, it's not just about the money. The the the money paid by foreign students helps keeps tuition low for instate students at many of our universities. They are viewed as kind of a cost center. And it's not just a benefit to them. It actually benefits
instate students with lower tuition. So, how do you find the balance? This administration has canceled billions of dollars in federal research, making many of our researchers vulnerable to g being recruited by universities in other countries, not necessarily China, but
Canada and the UK and universities in Europe. We're losing researchers because of cuts to research funding. Um, last spring the administration shocked international students enrolled on our campuses through sudden visa revocations. And so, as a result, we're
seeing a very sharp decline in foreign students enrolling in American universities. Just in one year. The difference between fall 2024 and fall 2025. There was a 17% drop in enrollment of foreign students at US universities.
And many of my universities in Virginia see this sharp decline not only in undergraduate programs but graduate programs as well. And it does affect their finances and it affects their ability to hold tuition low for instate students. I really worry about the
long-term consequences of the United States seeming more and more hostile to foreign students. Um there there's an economic reality. You mentioned the Nobel winners and the CEOs who come for our universities and stay and create
great great economic opportunities. There's also a bit of a diplomatic reality and we see this in the military too. The the training programs that we do for foreign military leaders. They go back to their country as maybe a mid-level officer and in 10 years they're a minister of defense and in 20
years they might be president and they have this experience a positive experience of America from the training they've gotten at the National Defense University, the Army War College or some of our universities. So how do we find I mean this is really a question to all of you. How how do we
find the balance of protecting security in the way you want to, but continuing to maintain the position of the United States as the magnet for the most talented people in the world? That's that's the way our nation stays young at 250 by continuing to attract talented
people. How do we how do we do that? Mr. Dailyy, start with you and I hope to hear from the others as well. Well, I think we've done it very well, as I said, over the past 10 years by hearings and discussions like this, by bringing academics, issue experts together with Congress and the national security agencies to discuss these issues. We
have to remain very vigilant, but we also have to recognize and there's no choice about this that while we want our innovation system, our science and technology, our military abilities to be number one in the world, in fact, the knowledge generation system is global.
There's nothing we can do about that, right? And so we have to engage with other countries including China, which yes, has stolen a great deal and which is also increasingly innovative. And we have to be realistic about that. You know, in 2016, the the Nature Index,
they said the top 10 world's top 10 academic institutions uh nine were American, one was Chinese. In 2024, eight of the world's top 10 by jury uh by by peer-driven review measure, eight
were Chinese and two were American. So, it's a global enterprise. We have to bring people in from all over the world. And yes, that's a vulnerability. And so, the answer is working closely like this as we have been for a decade. We've got a lot more to offer than China in the long run. And I think there will be
vulnerabilities and there will be failures, but we can prevail in this. I'm I'm out of time, but I'm just assuming Dr. Wood and Mr. Singleton, you agree that this is sort of a balance issue. We don't want to seed our position as the global talent magnet. And so getting this security right is
really important, but we have to do it in ways that continue to make the most talented people in the world want to come to the United States and hopefully expand our opportunities here for American citizens. Is that fair? May I just add that the largest percentage of
international students studying in the United States come from India. Nobody to my knowledge has raised questions that Indian students coming to the United States pose a security risk. There are many other nations in the world who send their students to study in the United
States with no security concerns whatsoever. >> U this is not a matter of uh checking people off by ethnicity. That's a civil rights violation. We are concerned about people who themselves might be perfectly innocent but come from a nation that
puts pressure on their families that even threatens them with death if they do not cooperate with the state interest. That's a situation that we cannot tolerate as a nation. And our our security concerns here in this one
particular instance have to override our concerns for intellectual openness. As for the uh high standing of Chinese universities, a lot of that comes out of paper mills. They are generating papers by the tens of thousands, most of which
are just utterly worthless. The the intellectual vacuity of a lot of the Chinese publications exists solely for the purpose of getting them elevated in the international rankings. >> I'll stop there. >> I yield back. Thank Thank you,
>> uh, Mr. Mr. Singleton, I was I was just in the hallway a minute ago, and this this happens from time to time. Um, the really wacky uh left-wing radical group Code Pink loves to chase us around the hallway. Um, I I I I find it humorous
when they do. I don't really even know what they stand for. They obviously I I from my from the shouting and the back and forth with them, they apparently hate Israel. They love abortion. I don't think they like America either. But what are their ties to the Chinese Communist
Party? >> Thank you, sir. It's it's an area that's a little outside of my expertise, but there are some very known documented ties between Code Pink and Chinese Communist Party affiliated entities and institutions. I believe one of them is called the Singum Network. It's again
not an area of my specific expertise and I have other colleagues at the foundation who track it closely. But that flow of money uh and the disruptive effects that it has here are are quite alarming and ultimately I think uh probably worthy of a lot more interest pursuit and scrutiny from Congress.
>> What do they do on college campuses? I'm I'm curious co code pink. I mean I they apparently they don't have jobs. They hang out in the halls of the Capitol building and chase uh congressmen and senators around of the of their opposing viewpoint. They don't like to have conversations either. I mean they just
want to be disruptive. So what what's what is their interest on college campuses? >> I'm a professor myself and I I haven't yet encountered them, though maybe after this testimony I will. Um I think in many respects it seems as though a lot of their tactics mirror those of former
Confucious Institutes and Chinese students and scholars associations which are Chinese funded Chinese government funded and directed entities on US college campuses. Some of that includes monitoring students and stifling disscent. Um, for example, if there's
going to be a public speaker on campus that wants to talk about human rights in China, they'll organize protests to be disruptive. Um, ultimately it undermines academic integrity, but I think at least on the Chinese students and scholars front, Congress has options there. Uh,
they should be subject to FAR registration. We should be strongly thinking about whether US universities that host these associations uh should be receiving certain types of funding. Um but I think a lot more work needs to be done on CSSAs that hasn't been done. >> Yeah. Um uh switching gears a little
bit, under section 117 of the Higher Education Act, universities only have to disclose foreign donations that exceed or contracts or gifts that exceed a quarter of a million, $250,000. Do you believe that threshold is still appropriate in today's geopolitical
environment? >> Absolutely not. Transparency strengthens trust. Um, the deterrent act, for example, doesn't do anything about restricting academic collaboration. It's only about clear and consistent financial disclosure down to the dollar.
I remember going to a university, a University of Florida. I had an amazing experience in education there. I remember two months after I graduated, I received a bill because I had had a Gatorade on my last day of school and I owed $2.20 or something like that to the cafeteria. Every dollar at multi-billion
dollar institutions and enterprises is tracked. These ca these checks were cashed. They the information exists somewhere. Why don't we just have it broad beyond China. Every check that comes in, have it be available. Um it's not hard anymore because every
university uses sophisticated accounting software that accounts for this. All we're saying is that the transparency actually I think makes it removes the ambiguity and it actually strengthens trust uh for universities. >> So report all of it. >> Why not report all of it for everybody?
>> Be easy to do that, right? >> All of the funders uh all of the cutthroughs and intermediaries that Peter rightly pointed out. Put it all out there. I don't know. It's it's agnostic against country. >> It used to be really hard to work the the Department of Education where these reports would be submitted used to be
really hard to get them. But is it easier today to find reports of foreign gifts online? I mean, is it is it totally transparent or what more can we do to fix that? >> It used to be extremely difficult. Uh, for example, during the Biden administration, they didn't report any
of the donor data for four years. So, it was sort of a black hole for four years. The current department of education is investing heavily in this new portal where again in tanches as schools contribute information. We should have a much better sense of the exact donor
names uh where the money is coming from. But we have to also go farther and say well what's the money for? Again when you cut a big check or you sign a research partnership there's paper it exists. It wouldn't be difficult for all of that to be uh publicly available and
it should be. I I used to be struck too by the um maybe this has changed or improved, but at least a few years ago, the federal department of education hardly had any security clearances of their top top uh the secretary under
secretaries. I mean, they should all have security clearances. So, they're read in on why much of this matters, right? Maybe that's been improved. I don't know. >> No, you're absolutely right. It's a deficiency. This system is entirely fragmented and because of uh sort of
stovepipe outdated clearance processes, this information isn't shared. It's not even shared with universities. They might not even know that they're partnering with entities that support, for example, China's nuclear weapons program, which exists. Um I think it's pretty alarming and concerning. Some
states, including Florida, have taken strong steps in these uh in this regard, but a lot more needs to be done. >> Thank you. My time is exp. >> Senator Hickinlooper. >> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh, I thank all of you for for being here and for engaging
in this. Um, you're probably not aware of this, but I am a recovering scientist. I have a master's in in earth environmental science, studied volcanic rocks in South Central Montana. Like many young people, I found it
irresistible to be able to go out and study and learn and and be in some of the most beautiful landscapes on Earth. Um, but then I grew to love the laboratory as well and and and the pursuits. I'm not sure how I ended up in
the Senate. Um, it's a a long trajectory I won't bore you with, but it is I think I'm the last scientist, and if you define that as someone who's had their their research peer-reviewed and published in in journals, I'm the last senator uh to actually be a scientist.
>> Excuse me. >> With the exception of the chair. Um, but he's a doctor. That's I don't think that's really the same. Um, uh, I know that we share the bipartisan goal of promoting research and security
and strengthening our STEM pipeline with the brightest minds. And obviously that includes people from all backgrounds. And so much of research is published and and put out there and shared on an international level. Um,
these different backgrounds, as you've all said, in different ways, aren't bound by international borders. Uh but according to the National Science Board's latest report, over half of our doctorates in computer science, math, and engineering at this point are are
foreignb born. Uh and I think it it's part of that that makes it so concerning. uh things like uh there was a recent report that came out of NIST, National Institute of Science of uh Standards and Technology um that they
were considering expelling 500 researchers from working on cutting edge research at NIST um because they're non- US citizens. And what was so surprising, this wasn't questions of Russians or or Chinese, but
they included Canadians in this I know we've had some complex relationships with Canada recently, uh, but I think our scientific communities are still relatively allied. So, Mr. Dailyaly, why don't I start with you and just ask, how do you think targeted attacks like these
on international researchers working in our universities um, and federal labs uh, is going to affect enrollment in the STEM fields? >> The NIST case is of particular concern. As you said, it's the National Institute of Standards and Technologies. A major
part of our technology competition with China. One of the major reasons that we worry about Huawei, we learn we worry a lot about its other, you know, leading uh companies is not just that they're selling 5G systems internationally, which is a huge concern, but that because they're able to deliver these
systems to countries in the global south quickly, cheaply, and that are good enough. They also lead in setting global telecom standards which shape the subsequent competition. NIST is our biggest it's our bull work of defense
against that. We have been the previous leaders in global standards for that reason. And so the standards piece it's not just the new gizmos important as they are. It's the global standards that set markets. It's what designers are going to design to. And so I'm particularly worried about that. NIST built the cyber security framework, the
AI riskmanagement framework. All of this is now under threat uh because of that. >> Great. I agree. M Mr. Singleton your perception on that? >> Sure. China is a special case and so I think Dr. Wood hit the nail on the head
here when we're talking about separating China and the risk posed by Chinese military civil fusion into a separate category of risk. Because when we talk about global standards, we're actually only talking about two countries. The United States standard and the Chinese standard. again a special category of
both uh global applicabil applicability across technologies. We want to be the leaders there and we want to do that with partners and friends. But again, I think the reason that we focus so much on China is because they are the very clear foil to our desire to have an open
and free and particularly free marketbased approach to this uh that doesn't strengthen authoritarian regimes. That's why China is a special case here. But I certainly don't think we should be expelling all foreign students and I don't even I I very strongly believe that not all Chinese
students are spies. I think I think that's inherently a flawed flawed approach. >> Great. Thank you. Dr. Wood, do you want to have anything to add? >> I have nothing to add to that. >> I I understand. I'm out of time. Um, so as I do think NIST has unique power, we
don't often recognize it, but that that convening power to establish what are the global standards has ramifications far beyond what most people ever consider. So appreciate you guys bringing that up. Um, and as as one of two scientists left in the United States
Senate, um, I'll yield the floor back to the chair to the other scientists. I'm I'm yielding back to the other scientists in the United States Senate. >> Unfortunately, I'm yielding to a Florida Gator who will be asking all their questions of another Florida Gator. So, >> I'm so excited you finally got on board
inviting a genius from the University of Florida. >> As a proudly educated Gator, I have made it my mission as one of the newest senators to be the first to get the most goget Gators on the official record at hearing. I think I'm up to close to 10
by now. Thank you and welcome. Uh and thank you Mr. Chairman for uh holding this hearing to examine a really concerning truth that many of our universities have been infiltrated by foreign interests and the hearing where we are specifically talking about malign
foreign influence on our universities I think is incredibly important. Um, I've heard it come up a lot and I know a lot of people are familiar with the Confucious Institutes which kind of took took embedded in universities really under our noses before people started
waking up and figuring out what was going on that they were in fact a vehicle for CCP influence and propaganda operations in the United States. And as Mr. Singleton said, I'm so proud of my state. We lead in many ways. This is one of them. When I was attorney general in
Florida, we outlawed these institutes from our state. Um, and many other states followed suit and I am hoping the few that are remaining, they wake up and and really dig in and see what's going on. Um, we also prohibited our universities from taking any kind of
money or research personnel from countries of concern like China, Iran, and um, at the time Venezuela. um so important to stay on top of these things. One of the things I think our state does well is we're very proactive
in in making sure we are rooting out this kind of influence. But besides organizations like the Confucious Institute, foreign government influence in our universities uh is gaining traction through these large obscene gifts or grants. uh and recent
statements from the department of education showed that during the last administration there was almost this obfuscation or push to prohibit disclosure or not go after when people when the universities didn't disclose that information to the public and I think it's concerning because public
trust in our institutions has really been declining since the China born COVID pandemic and the last thing anything anyone wants for our storied universities is to become pawns of foreign adversaries case that's the last thing any of us want and and I also
agree with the notion that students that are want to come and learn um obviously we need to that that has historically been um a re we have offered that opportunity and we shouldn't just cut that off uh without
really examining specifically if there is malign influence in our university um and Dr. Wood, you talked a lot about the extraordinary funding of our top research institutions that where they
take money from the CCP specifically. Uh you said UCLA receives 129 million, Yale receives 410 million, Harvard receives 630 million. Um by the way, again this is illegal in the state of Florida. No serious person can see
those numbers and not understand that these universities can be influenced specifically um understanding that unlike in America Chinese they in their universities they understand they fully um imsh their
universities into the people's liberation army. Um, I think there's highly concerns that that some of those coming over here that are being embedded in in research that information gets spirited away to CCP agents directly
into the Chinese military industrial complex. And Mr. Singleton, you you said that the CCP is in fact paying for students to come over and be embedded in our universities. So, I want to go back to you uh Mr. Woods momentarily. Did you
know that, you know, we kind of pushed back on some of the Confucious Institutes, but did you know that in China they passed two laws that require all nationals, not just their students, but all nationals to cooperate with the CCP and provide information on demand?
>> Yes, I'm aware of that. and you were you were kind of singling out some other nations that send students here that you think we you know we shouldn't necessarily prohibit those visas but do you think it's a problem when a foreign adversary especially one that has been um
orchestrating ways to infiltrate and I could list take off for you Chinese student Chinese student Chinese student in America that has been caught stealing information flying drones over our military bases over and over and over again knowing that the laws are on on the books in China that requires them to
report back and we've even had disclosures where they have been pushing them to provide information and report back and they have. Does that concern you that we are still allowing uh this without further um legislation preventing that? >> Uh it absolutely does. I think you
framed this correctly by saying that the issue here is public trust. Americans at at large understand that China is stealing our lunch. The only people who don't seem to understand that are the college presidents and trustees who see
the money coming in and shrug and say okay that's good for us. Uh I'm I'm concerned yes that uh we are in a situation where the Chinese students are subject to state pressure to cooperate with their government. Even if they
don't want to, they will. But they also are being regimented by the Chinese students and scholars association, by the remnants of the Confucious Institutes and a whole galaxy of other Chinese organized efforts to make sure
that Chinese influence in America uh not just on campuses but in elections and everywhere else where they can get reaching pretty much unhindered. You know, I think and and Mr. Singleton said some of these this information we
could be actually helping China develop their nuclear program. That should put fear in every single one of us on this DAS. I've proposed a stop CCP visas act as long as these laws are outstanding in China to require cooperation by the students that they send and pay for to
come here. But if we don't get smarter and wake up and start examining who we're inviting into this country, we are we are promoting our own demise ultimately. So, thank you very much for being here and I will turn it over at this time to Senator Als. Thank you so much and thank you to our witnesses uh
for being here today. You know, while I agree that it's important to stamp out dangerous sources of foreign influence in our higher education system, I think it's important that we also address how cuts to research funding can increase foreign influence on the global stage
and undermine US competitiveness. The NIH drives economic growth. It fosters biotechnology and develops lifesaving treatments. Yet last year, President Trump and Secretary Kennedy's reckless research cuts directly caused our
state's preeminent higher education research institution to receive 40% fewer awards, representing a decline of around half of its research funding. Our state's public institutions are projected to lose 70 to 150 million
annually because of this administration. And if you include both public and private institutions, Maryland is down 82% in the number of awards and 85% in the value of awards over the past year. So Mr. Daly, my first question is for you.
You've expressed that you believe we are now in a new cold war with China. And I would like to know, how do cuts to research at our institutions impact our ability to compete with China and other adversaries in this new cold war? It's
clearly extremely negative. We've been very focused recently on ch the fact that China has a chokeold on us in critical minerals. They also have a chokeold in medical precursors. No China, no ibuprofen for Americans. They are now widely acknowledged in the expert community. Although I think that
we haven't paid enough attention to it in Congress to be the leaders in biofarmaceutical research. It is expected over the next 10 or 20 years that most of the major new therapies, most of the major new medicines will be coming out of China because we are no longer keeping pace and we are underresourcing what had been the
world's strongest, you know, medical and discovery institutions. And so it's it's a major concern and it also constitutes another chokehold potentially for China. We're keeping their electric vehicles out. What if they come up with a major therapy or another cure that can save American lives? Will we keep that out?
They're increasingly innovative and we are not yet falling behind but the tables are you know that the balance is shifting a bit. >> So now how does it we've also seen um the politicization of research dollars um by this
administration and I wonder how you believe that politicizing research dollars emboldens um our rivals. >> The universities are still the engine of our innovation system. They produce new knowledge on their own and most of the
major you know CEOs and scientists who work as entrepreneurs and have new discoveries are products of our educational institutions. About 90% of all American R&D doesn't happen on happen on campuses. It happens in national laboratories. It happens in you
know private corporations. I wondered when you talked about IP theft Craig if that was just from universities or if that was from across >> total most of it probably not from universities. So we need to talk about the role of corporations here too. Our goal is to compete with China,
>> right? And not Confucious Institutes are almost all gone. They were language teaching institutes. China's going to have as many nuclear warheads as we do by 2035. They're developing hypersonic glide re-entry vehicles that we can't stop. Our concern needs to shift to our
our real national strengths that matter in the competition with China. The universities are important. vigilance is necessary but I'm afraid there's a lack of proportionality. >> Now just also regarding talent so when it comes to attracting the best and brightest minds in the search for cures
and new technologies cuts to NIH and NSF research ultimately reduces slots for trained researchers and weakens public and private institutions capacity to train the next generation of researchers. One poll found that more than 45% of responding scientists said
that they were considering leaving the country following the disruption to science prompted by the Trump administration. So, how does catalyzing a talent uh brain drain challenge our ability to attract leading minds away from our adversaries and our rivals? And
how is China working to aggressively recruit top scientists, including those of Chinese descent, leaving the United States? I think I think everybody today has advocated for balance recognizing the real vulnerabilities and the need to continue to attract people. It has to be
said that the people leaving uh and those numbers are growing there's push because they don't feel safe or welcomed here. But there's also pull. China has tripled its number of universities and is giving more and more money to R&D and they will you know they go back and they get brand new laboratories. So, we need
to think about China here not only as a threat to be defended against, but as I said, we have to go on offense and provide research dollars and facilities to match those of China, both to develop our own native talent and to attract the best foreign talent. >> Thank you. I yield.
>> Thank you, Senator Markley. Marky. >> Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. No one here wants corruption in higher education. No one. wants our colleges and universities to be beholden to other
countries. But it shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone that the Trump administration is weaponizing good faith compliance with section 117, reporting to continue its war on higher
education. This administration's focus on quote foreign influence in education is just another distraction from the corrupt wheeling and dealing by our fraudster in chief in the Oval Office. If we want to
talk about malign foreign influence, we need to look no further than 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Right before his second inauguration, Trump's crypto company accepted a half a billion dollars from the United Arab Emirates.
Then just 6 months later, in May of 2025, another UAE backed firm financed a deal with $2 billion of Trump's cryptocurrency. And just a few weeks later, Trump
greenlighted the UAE's purchase of 500,000 AI chips. Just a coincidence, right? Doesn't stop there. Last May, Trump accepted a $400
million Boeing luxury liner from Qatar to use as Air Force One, a deal approved by Attorney General Pam Bondi, a former lobbyist for the Qataris. But is it just a coincidence that three
days later, Qatar was the first foreign entity allowed to purchase new American counter drone systems? I don't think so. Don't worry, the Saudis are in on it, too. Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law,
accepted a $2 billion Saudi investment in his private equity firm. The Trump administration simultaneously continues to cozy up to the Saudis, including advancing a plan to give nuclear weapon
wannabe Saudi Arabia nuclear technology dangerous. We can also talk about China. Just last week, Chinese cryptobillionaire Justin Sun, who bought more than $90 million in Trump crypto,
had his SEC fraud case dropped. If we want to promote quote transparency and trust, let's start with the malign foreign influence of this White House. Poor Jimmy Carter.
He just he had to give up his peanut farm. Now the American people are getting peanuts from this administration while gas prices surge, health care costs are spiking, and we are sucked into another war in the Middle East. So,
I'll be the first to work with the Republicans on this committee if there is deep-seated malign foreign influence that is unressed in our colleges and universities. But our colleges and universities are our greatest geopolitical asset. Over a million
international students study every year at American institutions. And we're seeing China and Europe now poach scientists and researchers because of this administration's foolish attacks on higher education. That is our greatest asset. Last month,
the Boston Globe warned, quote, "With federal support for scientific research now unpredictable in the United States, a brain drain to China may be possible in the coming years." So, Mr. Daily is an administration that accepts billions
of investments in Trump crypto companies from foreign governments and makes sweetheart deals and guts research funding leading. Is it leading to a brain drain? Uh and is that a national security risk for our country long term?
>> We see some evidence of a brain drain. Uh thank you for the question. I think I'll continue to work with universities and all of you and the security agencies to get the balance on China right. That's the focus of my work. But yes, I do worry about a reverse brain drain. >> Yeah. Because if there are bad actors,
thank you. I want to work on that as well. Seeking undue influence, our colleges and universities, we should root it out. But dismantling the Department of Education, naming the head of the World Wrestling Federation to be the head of the Department of Education, that's not
going to help. And neither will cutting research grants, pushing scientists overseas for better opportunities. We truly want to put America first. and let's start by cleaning up the corruption in this White House. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. >> Thank you, Senator Marky. Um, so my
advantage is I get to listen to everybody and um uh and so let me just kind of start there. Mr. Dr. Wood starts off by saying that some of the money coming in may be
rebranded. Now, we don't know that, but there's a you have to be careful about that. The Department of Education says that as much as a third of foreign contributions are not reported. Now, there's a
stretching there. Now, Mr. Dailyaly, you suggest that the previous legislation and the kind of last 10 years have solved the problem, but let me start with you. If onethird of the money coming in is not reported,
which granted could all be a bunch of gifts less than 250,000, but probably not. And if Dr. Wood is correct, that large that a half a billion dollars is coming through Gernzi, which is a island notorious for moneyaundering. So, it's easy to imagine dollars are put there
and funneled here. Uh, this hearing is about transparency. Frankly, it's supposed to be about transparency, not where uh the student originates from. It's about transparency. So, so I say this because I respect all three of you. You've done a great job.
Do one, do you agree that as much as onethird of the donations may not be transparently reported? Um, and assuming that Dr. Wood is correct that a half a billion is coming from Gernzie, which is again, as we said, a conduit for people
who don't want their identities known. Thoughts about that? Well, I can't confirm any of those statistics. Uh, I can say that having visited a great many public and private major research universities to discuss this, I would be surprised if a third
currently currently is unreported. All I see on universities uh is vigilance again at tremendous expense and a disposition now again we we this has shifted a disposition now to assume that at least for projects are coming from China and related to STEM that the
answer may well be no okay >> the message is received >> so in the the conversation you're kind of veered towards China but really the conversation was about a lot of things and the largest single donor is cutter by the way cutter paid for a pharmacy building at Xavier University after hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. And so I
want to say that that we we can't bring black or white here. We've got to accept that there is nuance. And so that's where I go back to transparency. So so so I just I just want to point this out. It's not so much about China, even though that's your expertise. It's about kind of transparency.
>> Well, here I I think that uh you know, Craig is right that we can do a better job with 117. And for all of the reasons that have been mentioned and and I like Craig, I I think that it's a good idea to lower the reporting requirements from 250,000 250,000 or in some cases uh
lower. But what is the use of this portal? Uh everything is lumped together. These are cumulative numbers that do not paint a an accurate or a useful picture of what is happening now. It would not be at all difficult to line
up bars on the portal that show donations by year broken down by country. And again, I would like to know whether that would show that our work at least visav China. >> I'm told it's there, but it's difficult to ascertain. So, just to say that >> I couldn't I couldn't find it. I got
spreadsheets where everything was lumped together that give seem to give the impression that all foreign donations are malign, which is not true. that all donations from China come from the Chinese Communist Party, which is also not true. There are no distinctions made
and there's really no time series and we need that to judge the scale of the threat and whether our work is actually effective or not. I'd be careful of those cumul. >> Mr. Singleton, I see you nodding your head. Yes, you would agree with that. >> So, the Department of Education has made clear that the portal will be
continuously updated. We're seeing the first version and I agree. They have to ingest decades of data from different spreadsheets and sources and attempt to make sense of it. >> Yeah. But but I guess more to the point that that just because it's coming from
mainland China or fromQatar or from England or the United Kingdom um in of itself doesn't mean anything rather is the source of it and the purpose of it. >> Well, you can't manage risks you can't see. So the challenge here is that transparency protects universities,
policymakers and students alike which is why we don't know what we don't know here. Um the use of cutouts and intermediaries is very wellnown. It's particularly well known in the case of China. Um we should understand what the money buys. So it's beyond just the
disclosure of what the check amount was. We should have a very cleareyed view of what the money buys. And currently that's not required by law and most universities do not publicly transparency. I think the the agreement between the two of you is that yes, report the amount of money, but also tell us what the money buys.
>> Exactly. It should be two, right? >> Go back to a medical school in Doha. The medical school in Doha will be providing educational opportunity for those who otherwise may not receive. >> Absolutely. Information is the is the ultimate goal here. Then we can effectively evaluate
which ones are benign or make sense or advance US national security. would that may be the way to kind of to build the bridge between witnesses. Would you agree with that assessment? >> I'm not sure. I think that this goes
beyond knowing what the source and the purpose is. You need to figure out how it's actually applied. We all know money is fungeible. You will drop a money bomb on a college. Some of it will go to a particular purpose. Some of it will be siphoned off into overhead. That overhead money will be used for other
purposes. you really have to know where the money is actually going and what it's doing on campus. Uh I think Qatar since we've talked about that uh spends some of its money in very wholesome ways but when it funds Alazer and trains
Alazer at Northwestern University that's not quite so wholesome. We also >> So let me stop you there. Y >> so the degree that okay here's a bucket of dollars coming from X country >> and this is funding a way to go after critical minerals in a way that benefits
the US and this is going to um uh Alazera um I think what I heard from the first two is that if that's clearly known now your point is I accept that some of it's going for overhead and some of it's funable but theoretically if you knew
that we got $5 million and and 2 million went for overhead and 3 million went for this program. That would give you insight into that. >> I think it would give us an ability to make more credential judgments as to whether it's worth having the money
given that Alazer is going to get a portion of it. Um but I think that there there's a lot more to this. We are in a situation where the foreign funding comes in a very mixed picture from some countries. Qatar is an example of that.
China is not. The money that we get from China is almost all used in to some degree for a mischievous purpose. Um so transparency is a broad term. It has to be driven down to >> we have an example from Mr. Daly. I'm
thinking Mr. Daily is saying there might be a Chinese billionaire who decides to fund a chair of English at a university u and wink wink his daughter then gets accepted. Uh that would be relatively benign I presume except for denying
entrance perhaps if there's a limited number of people to be accepted. >> Well I see a complication there. There is a Chinese billionaire Singum is the guy. He's the one who funds Code Pink. I see his minions in New York City on the
subway with their anti-semitic signs all the time. Um, the Chinese billionaire who's funding something at Colombia University so that his uh uh progeny get favorable treatment
that you might think is one thing and Chinese malign influence is something else, but they're really not. If it's coming from China, it has an ulterior purpose. Let me stop you there because um I'm not out of time because I'm the very last one. I can take as much time as I want, but you know, still at some
point it has to end. Mr. Daly, you just heard Dr. Wood's kind of prescription. Um response to that, please. >> Uh influence and mischief are pretty vague terms. Uh we have and again there there is a problem as we've all said and and to correct it and to respond to
Senator Husted who's no longer here, I had said that we haven't had a conviction for espionage on American campuses. uh the the the issue he raises about the photographs, you know, near military bases is real. >> MD Anderson is an academic institution and there was uh something at MD
Anderson. I'll just point that out because in principle that was the same thing. It wasn't Texas A&M, but it was MD Anderson. >> Sure. So there there's obviously there's Chinese espionage. They'll hoover up everything they can get by any means possible, but we've talked a lot today about influence and donations. I have
not yet heard and and correct me if I'm wrong any tying of a specific donation to a specific illegal activity on campus. Now the Confucious the Confucious Institutes were there to very much put a flavor in the
interpretation of uh Sino-American relationships and Taiwanese and and and >> so I I I advised two presidents at major American universities to get rid of their Confucious Institutes and I was part of the team at the nationalmies that wrote the final report on this and
yes there was a big problem with Confucious institutes but it wasn't an espionage problem. These were not hot beds of espionage. They were hot beds of mediocre Chinese language training. The problem was that once they had those I in my experience many universities were
hesitant because they felt they had this Chinese institute to take other actions that China wouldn't like. There was a second order problem of thinking that we had a Chinese partner on campus. I think that that is a big issue. Again I advise to to >> let me ask let me ask I was once told
and I'll direct this to you Mr. Singleton, even though China seems to be your direction, it was once told me that if if a Ivy League school gets $500 million for a center for Middle Eastern Studies, that influences the co the college faculty room. And indeed, going
back to after October the 7th, where did the anti-Semitic and anti-American rhetoric come from? Um, you buy a lot of influence when you hire a lot of faculty members. >> Uh, Mr. Singleton, any comments on that? Not only do you buy faculty members in
many of these cases the host government nation China or Qatar is in charge of curricula development. It's in >> Is that true? >> Yes. >> For Qatar Foundation International, they determine the curricula at Confucious Institute. >> Wait, you're talking about an American
institute of higher education. >> Correct. >> Uh prestigious. >> Yes. >> Uh who um gets the dollars? >> Yes. >> But they would seed authorship of their curriculum to another. >> That's correct. It's the same model that was employed in Confucious Institutes
because the Chinese Communist Party through Hanban, as Dr. Wood outlined, controlled teacher selection, teacher training and curricula. It's the same model. So, they can in fact control what students are learning on campus through these models. We have to do a lot more
to uncover the extent of these Qatari uh networks and to understand how they're influencing higher education. We already have a precedent though from the Chinese Communist Party and Confucious Institutes. >> So, let me um finish with this because obviously transparency is key.
>> I was um uh obviously we have conflict with Iran right now and and um I'm driving to New Orleans from Baton Rouge to take a flight up here and I pass a store that's run by an Iranian American and he's got a big billboard
with an Iranian flag saying thank you to President Trump. A lot of people who come here from those other countries come here from those other countries because they don't want those other countries. They love their country, but they've been squashed. And um uh and and we see the protest,
no, the celebrations of the death of the Ayatollah as an example of people from Iran who were chafing under the yoke of a terrible leadership. I suspect that is true of every autocratic government in the world.
People want freedom and they come here. So um so obviously we can't play we can't paint a broad brush. If somebody comes from a country which is adversarial with us they are therefore guilty of being an accomplice to that adversarial government. So the question
is you know is there transparency in that? Do we have trans transparency in the people who come here as research assistants so that we get those brains that are born elsewhere and they come here and benefit us but they get freedom? Dr. Wood, I'll start with you and I'll finish. That'll be my last
question. >> I'm not quite sure I get the question, but >> so so is it possible to have this? We're talking about transparency for those scientists and educators and business people who come here from elsewhere be it China, be it Qatar Qatar, Iran, Russia, etc. who actually are fleeing a
government. They want our freedom and they end up becoming our great American citizens. Um um is there a way to adequately vet there? Well, we need to be prudent in every
case when we grant a visa to somebody that we're not granting a visa to a re-immigrant from some other country uh who is uh making use of our procedures to slip slip in. But generally speaking,
most of the people who want to come here are coming here for legitimate purposes and need to be treated with respect as they pursue their their god-given freedoms. Um, no objection to that whatsoever, but there is an element here of uh being wise stewards of our own
freedom and not allowing it to be uh seized by those who want to undermine it. And they are here too. I I think the the Trump administration is doing a reasonably good job of trying to vet the people who are already here under visas
but are using those visas to spread anti-semitic propaganda, anti-American activities or to engage in intellectual property theft. >> You agree with that, sir? >> I think our goal should be to retain as much top talent as possible. I think
it's Xi Jinping's worst nightmare. the idea that his top researchers would stay in the United States and contribute here and embrace liberty and democracy. I think that's a big concern for them. As a former US diplomat, I would tell you that the adjudication of visas is incredibly difficult. It's impossible
within that 30 to 45 second interview to actually determine whether this person represents a national security threat. We haven't built up the training for consular officers worldwide, the security databases that they need to adjudicate these decisions. And so that's one of the core reasons why so
many of these problematic researchers, particularly those associated with Chinese talent programs like the the thousand talents program, slip through the system. It's absolutely possible to enhance vetting. I think the case is very specific to China because it's a party stateirected initiative to steal
our intellectual capital and to operate on our college campuses because as we've all outlined, those are the centers of our innovation growth. Uh we've done an increasingly good job on research integrity over the past 10 years. We can continue to do a better
job through increasing transparency in the ways that we've described. But we also need to keep our eyes on the main issue USChina competition. I'm a lot more worried about the fact that China will have the same number of nuclear warheads than we have that we have in 2035. I'm more worried about that than
the fact that a Confucious Institute that was kicked off an American college campus may now be offering Chinese language classes in a local elementary school. That's not where we need our focus when we think about USChina innovation competition. >> Thank you all.
For any senator wishing to ask additional questions, questions for the records are due 5:00 pm Thursday, March 26. Thank you for being here. The committee stands adjourned.